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Abstract: We present three experiments using a sequential binary choice task that 
explore the relationship between two proposed cognitive control functions: set-
shifting and place-keeping (i.e., keeping track of one’s place within a sequential 
task). The task involves switching from one stimulus-response mapping to another 
across trials, according to a predefined sequence and in the face of occasional brief 
interruptions. Response-stimulus interval, interruption length and interrupting task 
were varied. The robust finding across all experiments was that varying response-
stimulus interval led to standard effects attributable to set-shifting, while varying 
interruption length led to standard effects attributable to place-keeping, but in no 
cases did the factors interact. We interpret the results as supporting the view that 
set-shifting and place-keeping are achieved by separable control processes and 
illustrate this interpretation with a computational model of performance on the task.  
1 Introduction 
Almost 25 years ago Rogers and Monsell (1995) lamented the fact that, while it had 
“long been understood that cognitive processes require control processes to organize 
them”, the mechanisms supporting that control were “to put it mildly – poorly 
understood” (p. 207). Much progress has been made in the intervening years (see, Logie, 
2016, for a recent summary and discussion), yet the majority of studies have focused on 
one aspect of cognitive control or “executive function” (whether it be related to set-
shifting, response inhibition, etc.), typically using relatively simple tasks. There is of 
course good reason for this, as initial progress would not have been possible without 
good levels of process purity (i.e., tasks whose performance primarily involves the 
operation of a single putative executive function) and high levels of experimental 
control over the many variables that affect performance on tasks that require elements 
of cognitive control. 
Yet many tasks, particularly those outside of the laboratory, involve multiple putative 
cognitive control mechanisms working together if optimal (or even good) levels of 
performance are to be achieved. Indeed, even the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST: 
Milner, 1963), which is widely used in the clinical assessment of executive functioning 
and where large numbers of perseverative errors are taken to indicate an impairment of 
such function, requires the coordinated operation of multiple processes to maintain a 
sorting rule in memory, process both positive and negative feedback, inhibit the use of 
failed sorting rules, and infer, select and apply alternative potential sorting rules. While 
the WCST is often considered to be a “set-shifting” task (i.e., a task that primarily taps 
the executive function of set-shifting: Miyake et al., 2000), the avoidance of 
perseverative errors actually requires the successful coordinated functioning of several 
different control processes (Stuss et al., 2000). Significant research questions therefore 
remain concerning the operation of control processes in more complex tasks. 
This paper uses a task of moderate complexity to explore the operation and potential 
interaction of two processes that have been held to be involved in related aspects of 
cognitive control. The processes are set-shifting, for which there is a well-established 
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literature spanning a century of work (see Monsell, 2003, and Vandierendonck et al., 
2010, for reviews and, in the latter case, a theoretical synthesis), and place-keeping, a 
control process introduced more recently by Altmann et al. (2014) in order to account 
for participant performance on sequential tasks in the face of interruptions. We begin by 
reviewing the two processes before introducing a variant of Altmann et al.’s (2014) 
UNRAVEL task. We argue that performance of the task recruits both set-shifting and 
place-keeping processes, and present three experiments which suggest that these 
processes operate independently. On the basis of these results, we further argue that 
distinct representations of task are involved in the cognitive processes underlying set-
shifting and place-keeping, and illustrate this with a computational model that simulates 
key behavioral effects. 
1.1 Set-Shifting 
“Task set” refers to the configuration of the cognitive system required to perform a 
specific task (see, e.g., Logan & Gordon, 2001; Schneider & Logan, 2007), including 
the configuration of attentional and response-selection processes, the priming or 
activation of learned stimulus-response associations, and so on. Thus a color-naming 
task set would consist of attentional orientation to color input, activating associations 
between visual color inputs as stimuli and the corresponding verbal names as responses, 
and setting a suitable response-selection threshold for verbal output, while a word-
reading task set would consist of attentional orientation to visual word inputs, activation 
of associations between visual word inputs as stimuli and the corresponding 
verbalizations as responses, and perhaps a similar response-selection configuration. Set-
shifting is held to be required whenever higher order processing requires changing from 
one task set to another (i.e., whenever task-switching is required). 
While a number of empirical paradigms have been developed to explore set-shifting, it 
is typically evidenced by choice reaction time tasks where participants respond by 
categorizing blocks of stimuli in different ways on different trials. Participants take 
longer to respond, and are more likely to err, on trials following a change in the 
categorization rule compared to trials that do not require a change in the rule – the so-
called switch cost. There is debate about the cognitive processes that give rise to this 
cost. One view is that switch costs reflect management of interference from the 
preceding task set on the new task set (e.g., Allport & Wiley, 2000). A competing view 
is that they reflect processes involved in reconfiguring the cognitive system for the new 
task set (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995). A middle ground is advocated by 
Vandierendonck et al. (2010), who argue that set-shifting requires both interference 
management and task set reconfiguration. 
One key finding in the task-switching literature is that switch costs can be reduced by 
forewarning participants of an impending change of set. Thus, Rogers and Monsell 
(1995) used a set-shifting task in which participants could anticipate the task set that 
would be appropriate for the forthcoming stimulus. They explored the switch cost as a 
function of Response-Stimulus Interval (RSI: i.e., the interval between the response on 
trial n-1 and the presentation of the stimulus on trial n). Switch costs were lower when 
the RSI was high compared to when it was low, suggesting that participants were able 
to use the RSI to prepare for the forthcoming task. However, the reduction in the switch 
cost was less than the increase in RSI (e.g., increasing RSI by 150 msec from 150 msec 
to 300 msec led to a reduction in switch cost of approximately 40 msec; Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995, experiment 4), and a residual switch cost remained even with very long 
RSI (1200 msec). One interpretation of this result is that when a task switch is 
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predictable, participants may use the RSI to reconfigure the cognitive system in 
preparation for the upcoming task set, but that stimulus presentation is necessary to 
complete these reconfiguration processes (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 1996). 
Alternatively, the RSI may allow dissipation or inhibition of the activation of the 
previous (competing) task set, with stimulus presentation being necessary to optimize 
performance and minimize interference from activation of other task sets (e.g., Allport 
& Wiley, 2000). A third interpretation proposed by De Jong (2000) is that participants 
are indeed fully able to reconfigure their cognitive systems during a sufficiently long 
RSI, but that they do not do this on all trials. On some trials they may “fail-to-engage” 
in preparation. On this account the residual switch cost is an artefact of averaging RT 
over trials. De Jong (2000) supports this interpretation through an analysis of RT 
distributions. 
Regardless of the precise origin of the residual switch cost, or of switch costs more 
generally, it is important to note for current purposes that the established view is that the 
processes required for task-set reconfiguration, i.e., processes related to the inhibition or 
disengagement of the current task set and/or the priming/engagement of the subsequent 
task set, must occur whenever switching from one task-set to another. That is, set-
shifting is not a process that only occurs in studies that explicitly measure switch costs. 
It is a process, or collection of processes, that occur whenever a change of task set is 
required, as, for example, when it is necessary to respond to different aspects of a 
stimulus on successive trials. 
1.2 Place-Keeping 
Studies of set-shifting typically require participants to switch between two or sometimes 
three tasks, with the target task on any trial being cued either explicitly or implicitly by 
some aspect of the stimulus, such as its position on the screen. Yet many tasks, 
particularly real-world tasks, are temporally extended and sequential in nature – they 
consist of multiple steps that should be performed in order but without explicit order 
cues. A fundamental question therefore concerns how the cognitive system generates 
sequential behavior. Prior to the cognitive revolution is had been argued that such 
behavior was the result of stimulus-response S-R chains (e.g., Washburn, 1916; Watson, 
1920; cited in Lashley, 1951), with one response in a sequence serving as the stimulus 
for the next S-R link. Lashley (1951) argued against this account on the grounds that the 
elements of sequential behaviors (both in the domains of language and skilled 
movement) have super-ordinate structure: R1 is not invariably followed by R2. Rather, 
R1 might be followed by R2 in one situation but by R3 in another. Lashley’s alternative 
proposal was that sequential behavior was governed by higher-order task 
representations which excite or partially activate elements of the sequence, with 
sequential order of those elements achieved through dynamic processes (the details of 
which he did not specify) operating on the partially activated elements. 
More recently, Altmann and colleagues (Altmann et al., 2014; Altman & Trafton, 2015) 
have proposed a process or mechanism of place-keeping, which, they argue is involved 
in maintaining one’s position in temporally extended sequential tasks. To date, Altmann 
and colleagues have investigated place-keeping by exploring the effects of interruptions 
on participants’ performance of a sequential task (i.e., on a task consisting of multiple 
steps that are required to be performed in a strict order). Errors in behavior following an 
interruption have frequently been used to inform theories of task maintenance (e.g., 
Byrne & Bovair, 1997; Botvinick & Bylsma, 2005; Altmann & Trafton, 2007; Li et al., 
2008), but even in the absence of interruptions, performance of sequential tasks is prone 
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to both perseverative errors (where steps are inappropriately repeated) and anticipatory 
errors (where steps are left out).2 Altmann et al. (2014) found that interruptions, even of 
just a few seconds, increase the probability of perseverative errors more than the 
probability of anticipatory errors. The authors interpret their findings within an 
information-processing model in which sequential processing relies upon associative 
links from the representation of the current step to the representation of the next step 
(i.e., a form of context-specific chaining), combined with activation decay to discourage 
reselection of recently completed steps (see Altman & Trafton, 2015).  
Hambrick and Altmann (2015) elaborate on these findings by showing in an individual 
differences study that place-keeping ability (measured in terms of sequential accuracy 
on the interrupted UNRAVEL task, as described below) correlates with fluid 
intelligence (as measured with Raven’s advanced progressive matrices), but not with 
working memory capacity, set-shifting or multi-tasking ability. They further argue that 
place-keeping is itself an executive function, i.e., one of a “suite of mental operations 
that coordinate and supervise other mental operations in the service of performing some 
task” (p. 104), and relate the function to more general mechanisms responsible for goal-
management. On this view it is of similar theoretical importance to more widely 
accepted executive functions, such as set-shifting as described above. Critically, place-
keeping is argued by Altmann and colleagues to be pervasive. That is, while their 
empirical investigations of place-keeping have been focused on the effects of 
interruption within a specific sequential task, the mechanisms that support place-
keeping are held to operate in any complex task where steps must be completed in a 
prescribed order. 
1.3 The UNRAVEL Task 
The UNRAVEL task (Altmann et al., 2014; Altmann & Trafton, 2015; Hambrick & 
Atlmann, 2015; Altmann & Hambrick, 2017) is a sequential binary choice response task 
in which successive steps involve responding to different dimensions of a compound 
stimulus. The order of the steps (i.e., the dimension for each successive response) is 
encoded in the acronym “UNRAVEL”, which serves as mnemonic. Two potential 
stimuli from the task are shown in figure 1. On the first step, participants are instructed 
to respond (by typing with their preferred fingers on a standard computer keyboard) 
with the letter ‘U’ if the stimulus contains an underlined character or ‘I’ if it contains an 
italic character. (Exactly one character in each stimulus is either underlined or italic.) 
On the second step, participants are instructed to respond with the letter ‘N’ if the letter 
in the stimulus is near the beginning of the alphabet and ‘F’ if it is far from the 
beginning. (Letters in the stimulus are either ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘U’ or ‘X’, so again there is no 
ambiguity in the response.) The procedure continues, with the possible responses on 
each step given by the rules in figure 1 and the step determined by cycling through the 
seven letters of “UNRAVEL” (i.e., after the ‘L’ step, participants are instructed to 
return to the ‘U’ step). Critically, the response options on each step are different, so it is 
possible to infer from a participant’s response their place in the UNRAVEL sequence. 
                                                
2 Whether anticipatory or perseverative errors dominate appears to depend on the specific sequential task 
(cf. Altmann et al., 2014, versus Trafton et al., 2011). 
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1.4 Set-Shifting and Place-Keeping in the UNRAVEL Task 
The UNRAVEL task was initially developed as a means of exploring error following 
interruption on a sequential task. Thus, Altmann, Trafton and colleagues (Altmann et al., 
2014; Altmann & Trafton, 2015) compared the types of errors made by participants 
when interrupted at random points in the UNRAVEL sequence. On trials that were not 
preceded by an interruption, participants occasionally left steps out (i.e., they made 
anticipation errors). More rarely they repeated steps (i.e., they made perseverative 
errors). On trials following a brief interruption (of 2 to 3 seconds), however, the rate of 
anticipatory errors increased slightly (from approximately 1.0% of trials to 1.5% of 
trials), while the rate of perseverative errors increased more markedly (from less than 
0.5% to almost 3.0% of trials), with longer interruptions resulting in even more 
perseverative errors.  
As noted above, Altmann et al. (2014) interpret their results in terms of a cognitive 
operation of “place-keeping” that is held to be involved in maintaining one’s position 
within a sequential task. However, the basic (uninterrupted) UNRAVEL task also shares 
many key features with tasks commonly used to investigate set-shifting. As with the 
tasks reviewed by Monsell (2003), for example, stimuli are multidimensional and on 
 
 
Response 
Options 
Response Rules 
U 
N 
R 
A 
V 
E 
L 
I 
F 
Y 
B 
C 
O 
M 
Is a character Underlined or in Italic font? 
Is the letter Near to or Far from the beginning of the alphabet? 
Is a character in Red or Yellow? 
Is a character Above the box or Below the box? 
Is the letter a Vowel or a Consonant? 
Is the digit Even or Odd? 
Is the digit Less than five or More than five? 
 
Figure 1: Two sample stimuli from the UNRAVEL task (upper panel) and the seven response 
rules (lower panel). Adapted from Altmann et al. (2014).  
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different trials participants are required to respond to different dimensions, switching 
the dimension of the response (and hence the task set) on successive trials. In other 
words, the basic UNRAVEL task is a kind of set-shifting task in which the participant 
must shift set on each trial, using an internally maintained record of his/her position in 
the UNRAVEL sequence (which must be updated between each step) to determine the 
task set appropriate for each successive stimulus. 
The UNRAVEL task does not include repeat trials with the same task set, and so it does 
not afford calculation of, for example, switch costs. However, if the basic UNRAVEL 
task does recruit set-shifting processes, then one would anticipate that variables known 
to affect set-shifting performance should also affect performance on the UNRAVEL 
task. As discussed above, one such variable that has been extensively studied is the 
response-stimulus interval. Given that the required task set on successive UNRAVEL 
trials is deterministic and known to the participant, increasing the response-stimulus 
interval between UNRAVEL trials should, on the assumption that the UNRAVEL task 
requires set-shifting, result in faster response times. 
A second variable of interest in the (interrupted) UNRAVEL task is the temporal 
duration of interruptions. In the experiments of Altmann et al. (2014), participants were 
occasionally interrupted by a secondary task between trials of the UNRAVEL task. The 
secondary task involved using the keyboard to copy either 4 (experiment 1) or 2 
(experiment 2) characters that appeared on screen. Unsurprisingly, temporally longer 
durations led to more sequence errors. Interruption length is therefore a key variable that 
appears to affect the effectiveness of place-keeping processes on the interrupted 
UNRAVEL task. 
1.5 Overview of the Argument and Structure of the Paper 
Given the above context, the experiments reported below vary response-stimulus 
interval and interruption length within the UNRAVEL task in order to determine 
whether the control processes that support set-shifting and place-keeping are 
functionally independent. If the processes are independent, then introducing (or 
increasing) a response-stimulus interval within the UNRAVEL task should result in 
decreased response times on UNRAVEL trials, but should not affect measures of place-
keeping (i.e., sequence error rates). We consider the former (i.e., decreased RT) to be a 
“fingerprint” of the processes supporting set-shifting. Applying analogous logic, 
variation of interruption length should affect sequence error rates (in accordance with 
previous studies of the UNRAVEL task, and indicating the operation of place-keeping 
mechanisms), but should not affect measures relating to set-shifting. Alternatively, if 
participants use intervals between UNRAVEL trials to prepare for the next step, 
whether that preparation involves activation of the forthcoming set or 
inhibition/dissipation of the prior set (as the set-shifting literature would suggest), and 
the results of that preparation are accessible to or shared by processes that support 
place-keeping, then an interruption after the response-stimulus interval but prior to 
actual presentation of the stimulus should be less disruptive with longer response-
stimulus intervals (where greater task-set reconfiguration or dissipation may take place) 
than with shorter or no response-stimulus intervals (where more limited or no task-set 
reconfiguration/dissipation could take place). Regardless of this issue, if place-keeping 
and set-shifting are task-independent control functions, then the same pattern of results 
should hold regardless of the interrupting task. We therefore report three experiments, 
using different interrupting tasks, that explore the effects of response-stimulus interval 
and interruption length on a range of dependent measures. The results indicate that the 
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mechanisms underlying set-shifting and place-keeping are separable. In the discussion 
we consider implications of these findings for theoretical and computational accounts of 
the two control functions, and extend an existing computational model of set-shifting 
with place-keeping mechanisms in order to provide a theoretically novel account of our 
results. 
2 Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 sought to establish the independence or otherwise of place-keeping and 
set-shifting by replicating the Altmann et al. (2014) study but manipulating two 
variables: the response-stimulus interval within the UNRAVEL task and the length of 
the interruption. If successive steps on the UNRAVEL task involve set-shifting as 
argued in the introduction, and if place-keeping and set-shifting are independent, then 
manipulation of the response-stimulus interval within the UNRAVEL task should affect 
response times on that task (with longer response-stimulus intervals allowing greater 
preparation of the upcoming subtask, and hence resulting in shorter response times), but 
such a manipulation should have no effect on performance of the interrupting task or on 
resumption of the UNRAVEL task. Conversely, interruption length should affect the 
likelihood of a sequence error occurring on resumption of the UNRAVEL task (with 
longer interruptions resulting in more sequence errors) and this should not be modulated 
by response-stimulus interval. The alternative possibility is that the greater task-set 
preparation afforded by longer response-stimulus intervals will improve place-keeping 
and hence result in lower post-interruption error rates on the UNRAVEL task when the 
response-stimulus interval is longer. 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
Forty-five adult participants from the Birkbeck student community completed the study 
in exchange for course credit. Data from five participants were excluded because of 
equipment failure. The final sample therefore comprised 40 participants (25 female, 
mean age 27.3 years; 15 male, mean age 24.2 years). 
2.1.2 Design 
The experiment involved manipulation of two within-subjects factors: response-
stimulus interval (at three levels: 0 msec, 250 msec, and 500 msec) and interruption 
length (short, medium, long). The dependent measures were accuracy and response time 
on each task (i.e., on the UNRAVEL task and on the interrupting task, as described 
below) and number and type of errors on baseline trials of the UNRAVEL task (i.e., 
those not preceded by an interruption) and post-interruption trials of the UNRAVEL 
task.  
2.1.3 Interrupting Task: The Text-Copying Task 
In experiment 1 the interrupting task was a text-copying task similar to that used by 
Altmann et al. (2014). Thus, between some trials of the UNRAVEL task a screen 
appeared asking participants to use the keyboard to copy a sequence of letters. In 
contrast to Altmann et al., the number of to-be-copied letters varied on interrupting 
trials (with three levels: 4, 8 or 12, for short, medium and long interruptions 
respectively), and the letters were drawn from those that were not in the UNRAVEL 
response set (i.e., there were drawn from DGHJKPQSTWXZ). Participants were free to 
use their preferred fingers for typing their response in the text-copying task. On 
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completion of the task participants were instructed to press the return key, which was 
only enabled when the correct number of letters had been typed. This led to immediate 
continuation of the UNRAVEL task from the point at which the interruption occurred. 
Note that participants were not required to achieve perfect accuracy on the text-copying 
task, though accurate copying was stressed, and all participants achieved high levels of 
accuracy on the task. (See the results subsection.) 
2.1.4 Procedure 
Participants were first given an in-depth verbal introduction to the UNRAVEL task. In 
this introduction the acronym was highlighted, emphasizing each letter step-by-step 
together with its corresponding pair of response options. Once the task had been 
explained, participants were directed to a written summary of the instructions for each 
step, which was posted on the wall in their line of sight. This summary remained visible 
throughout the task. No instructions were given about typing responses with specific 
fingers (i.e., participants were free to use their individual typing preferences). 
Participants then completed two practice blocks of the task (administered on a standard 
PC with 21” monitor and 16:9 aspect ratio) to ensure that they understood the task. 
The first practice block consisted of 56 UNRAVEL trials (i.e., 8 repetitions of the full 
UNRAVEL sequence) and no interruption trials. Interruption trials, where participants 
were presented with a screen asking them to copy a string of letters as described above, 
were introduced on the second practice block. In this block there were two 4 letter, two 
8 letter and two 12 letter interruptions, distributed randomly throughout the UNRAVEL 
sequence according to a translated exponential distribution with minimum separation of 
3 UNRAVEL trials and a mean separation of 6 UNRAVEL trials between interruptions, 
as per the specification of Altmann et al. (2014). The mean number of UNRAVEL trials 
in this second practice block was 42, but the number of trials per participant varied 
depending on the number of trials between interruptions, which itself varied as 
described above. An experimenter remained present during the practice blocks to give 
assistance if needed. Moreover, during the practice blocks the program that 
administered the task provided feedback to participants on a trial-by-trial basis if they 
made an error on either task, indicating the correct response. In the case of the 
UNRAVEL task, and in this second practice block only, the program also indicated 
from which step the participant should resume. The response-stimulus interval (i.e., the 
interval between UNRAVEL trial responses and the presentation of the subsequent 
stimulus, whether it be another UNRAVEL trial or the interruption task) in the practice 
blocks was fixed within participants but varied between participants, being either 0 
msec, 250 msec or 500 msec. Note that, in all cases, completion of the interrupting task 
led immediately to resumption of the UNRAVEL task. That is, in all cases there was no 
interval between the participant entering their response to the interrupting task and 
presentation of the next UNRAVEL stimulus. 
Participants then completed 6 experimental blocks (without the experimenter present). 
Each experimental block was structured as in the second practice block but with three 
short, three medium and three long interruptions (and still a mean of six UNRAVEL 
trials between interruptions), resulting in a mean of approximately 60 UNRAVEL trials 
per block. The response-stimulus interval was the same on the first and fourth 
experimental blocks as in the practice blocks. On the second and fifth experimental 
blocks (and likewise the third and sixth experimental blocks) it took on one of the other 
possible values, with the permutation of response-stimulus intervals for experimental 
blocks 1, 2 and 3, randomized across participants. Feedback on individual trials was not 
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given within the experimental blocks. Instead, accuracy feedback was provided on 
screen at the end of each block (e.g., “That completes block 1. You scored 95% on this 
block.”). Each participant was individually tested in one session lasting between 45 and 
60 minutes. 
As in previous work with the UNRAVEL task, a different compound stimulus was 
presented on each trial, with successive stimuli differing in the digit, the letter, the 
position of the element outside of the box, the position or color of the colored element, 
and the position or font decoration of the italic/underlined element. Moreover, 
participants potentially had unlimited time to respond on each trial (i.e., trials did not 
time-out). 
Prior to embarking on data collection the experimental procedure was reviewed and 
approved by the departmental ethics committee.  
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 UNRAVEL Accuracy and Response Time 
One would anticipate that speed and accuracy on the UNRAVEL task will vary as a 
function of trial type. For example, one would anticipate faster and more accurate 
responses on ‘R’ trials (discriminating red or yellow) than ‘V’ trials (discriminating 
whether the letter is a vowel or consonant), simply because the former is a more 
practiced discrimination. Such an analysis would not be informative with respect to our 
hypotheses. We therefore pool the data from all trial types and focus first on 
UNRAVEL accuracy and response times on baseline trials (i.e., on trials not 
immediately preceded by an interruption) as a function of response-stimulus interval. 
UNRAVEL trials with response time of greater than 20 seconds (less than 0.1% of 
trials) were excluded from analysis, as were those immediately following an 
interruption. On the remaining trials, accuracy was generally high (see figure 2, left), 
resulting in a negatively skewed distribution. A one-way within-subjects ANOVA on 
the accuracy data (arcsine transformed, to reduce skew) revealed no effect of response-
stimulus interval (F(2, 78) = 0.009, p = 0.991, 𝜂!! = 0.000). In contrast, response time on 
correct trials decreased with response-stimulus interval, from a mean of 2610 msec to a 
mean of 2295 msec as response-stimulus interval increased from 0 msec to 500 msec 
(see figure 2, right), and a one-way within-subjects ANOVA revealed that the effect of 
response-stimulus interval on response time was significant (F(2, 78) = 15.685, p < 
0.001, 𝜂!!  = 0.287). Follow-up t-tests indicated that all pairwise differences were 
significant (0 msec versus 250 msec: t(39) = 2.847, p = 0.007; 250 msec versus 500 
msec: t(39) = 3.258, p = 0.002; two-tailed probabilities in both cases). 
Our interpretation of the UNRAVEL task as a switching task with interruptions implies 
that response time on post-interruption trials (where participants must recover their 
position in the UNRAVEL sequence) should be longer than on baseline trials (where 
position in the UNRAVEL sequence is more immediately available based on the 
previous trial). At the same time, since there was no response-stimulus interval between 
termination of an interruption and presentation of the first post-interruption UNRAVEL 
trial, baseline and post-interruption response times can only be directly compared in the 
0 msec RSI blocks. A one-within ANOVA on the RT for correct trials from these 
blocks, comparing across four levels of interruption length (none, short, medium and 
long), revealed a significant effect of interruption length (F(3, 117) = 4.126, p = 0.008, 
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𝜂!! = 0.096). While the rank order of mean response times reflected interruption length 
(2610 msec, 2629 msec, 2861 msec, 3094 msec for none, short, medium and long 
interruptions), the only statistically significant pairwise difference was that between RT 
following long interruptions compared with baseline trials (i.e., 3094 msec versus 2610 
msec:  t(39) = 2.885, p = 0.006, two-tailed).  
With regard to potential effects of response-stimulus interval on post-interruption 
response time our interpretation does not make clear predictions given that the RSI 
preceded but did not follow interruptions. Arguably, such effects might be attenuated 
(compared to baseline trials), given that any preparation prior to an interruption will 
wholly or partially dissipate during the completion of the interrupting task. A two-way 
within-subjects ANOVA on response time on correct post-interruption UNRAVEL 
trials was performed to test whether the effect of response-stimulus interval on baseline 
UNRAVEL trials persisted in post-interruption trials. While mean response times were 
slower for short response-stimulus intervals than long response-stimulus intervals (2861 
msec at 0 msec RSI versus 2686 msec at 500 msec RSI), the effect was not significant 
(main effect of response-stimulus interval: F(2, 78) = 1.735, p = 0.183, 𝜂!! = 0.043). 
However, there was (as would be anticipated from the preceding analysis) an effect of 
interruption length (F(1.551, 60.488) = 10.038, p = 0.001,  𝜂!!  = 0.205) on post-
interruption response time, with the longest interruptions leading to significantly longer 
response times than the shortest interruptions (2967 msec versus 2584 msec; t(39) = 
3.775, p = 0.001). Response-stimulus interval and interruption length did not interact in 
their effects on post-interruption response time (F(4, 156) = 0.934, p = 0.446, 𝜂!! = 
0.023). 
2.2.2 The Text-Copying Task 
In the analysis of performance on the interrupting task responses of more than 4 seconds 
per character were removed. (Only one response was excluded based on this criterion). 
Accuracy (i.e., the proportion of characters copied correctly) and response times, as a 
function of response-stimulus interval and interruption length, of the remaining data are 
shown in figure 3. As the figure shows, accuracy was high in all conditions, with no 
apparent effect of condition. The accuracy data was arcsine transformed to reduce skew 
due to the ceiling effect. A two-way ANOVA on the resultant data revealed no 
  
Figure 2: UNRAVEL accuracy (left) and response time (right), for trials not preceded by an 
interruption, as a function of response-stimulus interval in experiment 1. Error bars indicate 
one standard error. 
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significant effect of response-stimulus interval (F(2, 78) = 1.330, p = 0.270, 𝜂!! = 0.033), 
no significant effect of interruption length (F(2, 78) = 1.919, p = 0.154, 𝜂!! = 0.047), and 
no significant interaction (F(4, 156) = 0.225, p = 0.924, 𝜂!! = 0.006). 
A similar ANOVA was performed on response times for the interrupting task. The 
analysis revealed a significant effect of interruption length (F(1.169, 45.584) = 392.812, 
p < 0.001, 𝜂!! = 0.910), as would be expected, but no significant effect of response-
stimulus interval (F(2, 78) = 2.430, p = 0.095, 𝜂!! = 0.059) and no interaction between 
response-stimulus interval and interruption length (F(2.840, 110.769) = 1.069, p = 0.363, 𝜂!! = 0.027).3 Planned comparisons revealed, as expected that 12 letter interruptions 
took significantly longer than 8 letter interruptions at each level of response-stimulus 
interval (t(39) ≥ 11.455, p < 0.001, in all cases) which in turn took significantly longer 
than 4 letter interruptions (t(39) ≥ 14.259, p < 0.001, in all cases). This analysis 
confirms that the interruption length manipulation was effective in altering the time 
participants spent performing the interrupting task and validates the following analyses 
of post-interruption responses as a function of interruption length. 
2.2.3 Sequence Errors on the UNRAVEL Task 
Recall that a key feature of the UNRAVEL task is that the response options on each 
step are different. Consequently one can infer, from a participant’s response, the step to 
which the participant was responding. Critically, one can therefore detect and categorize 
sequence errors. Following Altmann et al. (2014), we encode such errors in terms of 
whether they are anticipatory (i.e., skipping forward) or perseverative (i.e., repeating a 
recent step), and in terms of the difference between the expected and actual step. More 
specifically, if a participant skips a step (e.g., responding with a ‘R’ or ‘Y’ when on the 
N step), we encode the response as an “A1” (anticipate one step) sequence error. If, on 
the other hand, the participant repeats the step before last (e.g., responding with an ‘N’ 
or ‘F’ when on the A step), we encode the response as a “P2” (perseverate two steps) 
sequence error.  
                                                
3 Sphericity was violated for all analyses involving interruption length (both here and in experiments 2 
and 3), and so Greenhouse-Geisser corrections to degrees of freedom were applied in all cases. 
  
Figure 3: Interruption task accuracy (left) and response time (right) as a function of 
response-stimulus interval and interruption length in experiment 1. Error bars indicate one 
standard error.  
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Figure 4 shows the proportion of errors of each type for baseline (i.e., non-interrupted) 
UNRAVEL trials (left) and post-interruption UNRAVEL trials (right, showing each 
level of interruption length) in experiment 1. Given the experimental design, each 
participant completed, for each level of response-stimulus interval, approximately 102 
baseline trials and exactly 18 trials following an interruption (6 trials following a short 
interruption, 6 trials following a medium interruption, and 6 trials following a long 
interruption). Thus, each participant had 102 opportunities to err on baseline trials in 
each of the three (within-subjects) cells of the experimental design but only 6 to err 
following an interruption in each of the nine (within-subjects) cells. The proportion of 
post-interruption errors, particularly when considered within a single cell of the 
experimental design, is therefore a coarse measure. Moreover many participants 
performed without error in at least one experimental cell. Therefore, for clarity, the 
upper panels of figure 4 show the data for each response-stimulus interval condition 
(but pooled over interruption duration where applicable) while the lower panels show 
the data pooled over response-stimulus interval.  
There are numerous analyses that might be performed on the sequence error data. One 
possibly surprising finding reported by Altmann et al. (2014) concerns the relative rates 
of perseverative and anticipatory errors in baseline (i.e., UNRAVEL trials not preceded 
by an interruption) as opposed to post-interruption trials. As with Altmann et al.’s study, 
  
  
Figure 4: Sequence error rates on baseline UNRAVEL trials (i.e., those not preceded by an 
interruption) (left) and on post-interruption UNRAVEL trials (right) in experiment 1. The 
upper panels show the data by response-stimulus interval (pooled over interruption duration 
in the upper right panel), while the lower panels show the data pooled over response-
stimulus interval. In all cases error bars indicate one standard error.   
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anticipatory errors were observed to be more common than perseverative errors 
following baseline trials, but the opposite was observed in post-interruption trials. 
Elaborating on Altmann et al.’s results, a comparison of P1 versus A1 error rates (log 
transformed, to reduce skew) as a function of interruption level (none, short, medium, 
long), using a 2 (error type) by 4 (interruption level) ANOVA, found no main effect of 
error type (F(1, 39) = 2.953, p = 0.094, 𝜂!! = 0.070), but a main effect of interruption 
level (F(2.355, 91.833) = 19.676, p < 0.001, 𝜂!! = 0.335), and a significant interaction 
(F(2.449, 95.526) = 3.258, p = 0.033, 𝜂!!  = 0.077), suggesting that the rates of 
perseverative and anticipatory errors varied as a function of interruption level. Follow-
up related t-tests on P1 versus A1 error rates revealed a significant difference in favor of 
A1 errors on baseline trials (t(39) = –2.603, p = 0.013, two-tailed), no significant 
difference following short interruptions (t(39) = 1.308, p = 0.199, two-tailed), and a 
significant difference in favor of P1 errors following medium interruptions (t(39) = 
2.631, p = 0.012, two-tailed). While P1 errors were relatively more frequent than A1 
errors following long interruptions, the comparison did not approach significance (t(39) 
= 0.412, p = 0.683, two-tailed). 
The preceding analysis collapses across response-stimulus interval on the UNRAVEL 
task, but a second key question concerns whether response-stimulus interval on the 
UNRAVEL task affects the rate of each type of error, either on baseline trials or on 
trials immediately following an interruption. A differential effect of response-stimulus 
interval across interruption length would suggest some form of shared mechanism 
underlying the cognitive processes that support set-shifting and place-keeping. In order 
to explore this question a 3 (response-stimulus interval) × 4 (interruption level: none, 
short, medium, long) multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) was performed on 
the (log transformed) proportions of each type of error (i.e., with six dependent 
measures: A1 errors, A2 errors, A3 errors, P1 errors, P2 errors and P3 errors). This 
analysis revealed no significant interaction between response-stimulus interval and 
interruption length (Pillai’s Trace = 0.912, F(33, 7) = 2.207, p = 0.139, 𝜂!! = 0.912) and 
no significant effect of response-stimulus interval (Pillai’s Trace = 0.465, F(12, 28) = 
2.024, p = 0.061, 𝜂!! = 0.465). In contrast to the absence of effects related to response-
stimulus interval, the effect of interruption length was significant (Pillai’s Trace = 0.706, 
F(17, 23) = 3.256, p = 0.005, 𝜂!! = 0.706). 
In considering the results of this MANOVA it should be stressed that the data are 
heavily skewed as errors are relatively rare, particularly following base-line trials.4 
Consequently the results must be interpreted with caution. While it appears that 
interruption length does, and response-stimulus interval does not, affect the rate of each 
type of error, additional evidence is necessary to make a more convincing case. In 
particular, to test for a null effect of response-stimulus interval (or its interaction with 
interruption length) on sequence errors, a series of Bayesian repeated measures 
ANOVAs were conducted on the sequence error data (untransformed proportions) using 
the JASP package (JASP Team, 2018; Version 0.8.5.1). Bayes factors for inclusion of 
each of the three potential model factors (RSI, interruption length (IL), and their 
interaction) for each error type (P3, P2, P1, A1, A2, A3) are shown in table 1. With the 
exception of A2 and A3 errors (which were rare), the data provide strong evidence 
(BFInc >> 1) for models with a single factor (interruption length). In contrast, the results 
                                                
4 Reanalysis of the data excluding the baseline trials, i.e., via a 3 × 3 MANOVA, reduces the violation of 
homogeneity of variance but yields qualitatively equivalent results. 
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generally provide evidence against (BFInc << 1) models that include RSI or the RSI × IL 
interaction term. 
2.3 Discussion 
The results of experiment 1 a) support the interpretation of the UNRAVEL task as 
involving the same cognitive processes as involved in more typical set-shifting tasks, b) 
extend the results of Altmann et al. (2014) concerning place-keeping and the relative 
proportions of perseverative and anticipatory errors in baseline performance and 
following an interruption, and c) suggest that cognitive processes that support set-
shifting and place-keeping operate independently. 
First, response time on the UNRAVEL task was faster with larger response-stimulus 
interval. This is consistent with an interpretation of UNRAVEL performance whereby 
participants are able to use the response-stimulus interval to prepare for the forthcoming 
task (either by activating components of the forthcoming task-set or by inhibiting those 
of the previous task-set), as in standard task-switching procedures where the response-
stimulus interval is varied (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Note however that increasing 
the response-stimulus interval from 0 msec to 250 msec lead to a reduction in response 
time of 142 msec, while increasing it from 250 msec to 500 msec led to a further 
reduction of 167 msec. In other words, when preparation time was available, the 
reduction in response time was somewhat less than the increase in preparation time, but 
further extending the preparation time resulted in a significantly greater reduction in 
response time. Moreover the reduction in response time did not appear to have been the 
result of a speed-accuracy tradeoff, as accuracy was not poorer in the 500 msec RSI 
condition (when responses were relatively fast) than in the 0 msec RSI condition (when 
responses were relatively slow).5 These results are all as would be expected based on 
prior work within more standard task-switching paradigms and support the claim that 
set-shifting processes are involved in configuring the cognitive system (through active 
                                                
5 Recall that participants completed two blocks of UNRAVEL trials at each level of response-stimulus 
interval. Further analysis, reported in the supplementary materials, found that UNRAVEL response time 
was faster on the second block for each level of response-stimulus interval, as would be expected from 
learning, but that the speed-up was independent of response-stimulus interval. That is, the reduction in 
response time was affected by response-stimulus interval but not practice, further supporting our 
conjecture that task-switching is an integral process within the UNRAVEL task. This independence of 
response-stimulus interval and practice on UNRAVEL response time held for all three studies reported 
here. 
 P3 P2 P1 A1 A2 A3 
RSI 0.021 0.629 0.069 0.029 0.039 0.047 
IL 34.563 356.533 3.6 × 105 4.9 × 105 1.158 0.019 
RSI × IL 0.002 0.880 0.015 0.002 0.024 2.4 × 10-4 
Table 1: Bayes Factors (BFInc) for inclusion of RSI, IL (interruption length) and their 
interaction in models of each sequence error type (experiment 1). Note that with the 
exception of A2 and A3 errors (which were rare), the data provide strong evidence for 
models (BFInc >> 1) with a single factor (interruption length). In contrast, the results 
generally provide evidence against models (BFInc << 1) that include RSI or the RSI × IL 
interaction term.  
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excitation of the upcoming task-set or through inhibition/dissipation of the previous 
task-set) between steps of the UNRAVEL task. 
Second, interruption length was, unsurprisingly, proportional to the number of letters 
copied in the text-copying task. That is, “larger” interruptions did indeed take longer. 
While this is to be expected, it licenses analysis of sequence error behavior as a function 
of interruption length. This analysis demonstrates that: a) in trials not preceded by an 
interruption, anticipatory sequence errors are more common than perseverative 
sequence errors, but b) perseverative sequence errors increase in relative frequency 
following an interruption, and this increase is monotonically related to the duration of 
the interruption. These results extend those of Altmann et al. (2014) (who considered 2 
letter and 4 letter interruptions in separate experiments), by showing in a single study 
that the rates of both anticipatory and perseverative errors increase with the duration of 
the interruption, though the rate of perseverative errors appears to increase more than 
that of anticipatory errors with longer interruptions. The increase in the rate of each 
error type can therefore not be attributed to between-study differences (e.g., subtle 
differences in task instruction or participant characteristics, as might be argued for the 
results of Altmann et al., 2014), but reflect within-subject differences in task-related 
processing during interruptions of different lengths. 
Third, while response-stimulus interval affected performance on the UNRAVEL task, it 
had no discernable effect on performance of the interrupting task (text-copying), either 
in terms of response time or accuracy. More critically, response-stimulus interval did 
not affect sequence error rates, either on baseline trials (i.e., those trials not preceded by 
an interruption) or on post-interruption trials. Thus, the effects of response-stimulus 
interval and size of interruption appear to be orthogonal. This suggests that the 
information-processing mechanisms responsible for set-shifting and those responsible 
for place-keeping are independent. More specifically, it appears that task-position 
maintenance during an interruption operates on a different representation of task-set 
than the mechanism that achieves task-set activation within the sequential task. As 
argued in the introduction, this is not a necessary result.  
While increasing the RSI from 0 msec to 500 msec appears to allow preparation of the 
next step, it does not alter the relative or absolute number of anticipatory or 
perseverative errors on such steps. This suggests a stage-like approach to task-set 
processing within the UNRAVEL task, where the current step is first retrieved and then 
prepared. Altering the response-stimulus interval affects preparation but not retrieval of 
the current step. Interruptions, by contrast, disrupt retrieval, specifically favoring the 
production of perseverative errors, with all levels of interruption having a more 
dramatic effect on perseverative errors than on anticipatory errors. 
A final issue that is worthy of note arises from a direct comparison of our results with 
those of Altmann et al. (2014). While the pattern of sequence error effects shown in 
figure 4 above replicates that of the earlier studies (cf. figure 4 of Altmann et al., 2014), 
there are quantitative differences. Thus, the baseline sequence error rate was higher in 
Altmann et al.’s studies (e.g., A1 errors accounted for 1.0% of baseline responses in 
their experiment 1, and 1.1% in their experiment 2, whereas in our study the figure was 
0.5%), as was the rate of sequence errors following a four-letter interruption (1.7% 
compared with 0.8%). These quantitative differences may be the result of participant 
characteristics or subtle procedural differences between the studies. It is reassuring, 
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however, that whatever the origin of these differences might be, they do not alter the 
qualitative effects of the independent variables.  
3 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate the findings of experiment 1 using a different 
interrupting task, thereby supporting the claim that the effects found in experiment 1 
reflect effects attributable to control processes rather than to the specific interrupting 
task. That is, if place-keeping and set-shifting are effected through independent 
processes or processes operating on separate representations, then the effects of 
interruption length and response-stimulus interval should hold regardless of the specific 
interrupting task. Moreover, given that the argument for the independence of the 
underlying processes is driven by the absence of an interaction between the variables 
(i.e., a null effect, albeit one in the presence of other effects), then failure to find any 
interaction on the key dependent measures in a second study will strengthen the 
conclusions of experiment 1. 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
Forty-three adult participants were recruited from Birkbeck’s volunteer panel and paid 
£7.50 to complete the study. Data from three participants were excluded because of 
equipment failure. The final sample therefore comprised 40 participants (26 female, 
mean age 27.8 years; 14 male, mean age 36.1 years). 
3.1.2 Design 
The design was the same as for experiment 1. 
3.1.3 Interrupting Task: Dot Counting 
In experiment 2 the interrupting task was a dot-counting task. For this task, the screen 
showed a rectangular box (450 pixels wide, 350 pixels high) containing up to 13 red 
dots, with each dot being 10 pixels in diameter and positioned at random and without 
overlap within the box. The box was centered on the screen, which was a standard 1680 
by 1050 pixel 21” monitor. Participants were asked to count the number of dots and use 
the keyboard to enter their answer. No instructions or constraints were given on use of 
specific fingers for typing the response. The primary UNRAVEL task resumed as soon 
as the participant pressed the return key (i.e., as in experiment 1, there was no interval 
between responding to the interruption and presentation of the subsequent UNRAVEL 
stimulus). 
3.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to experiment 1 except that the interrupting task (the text 
copying task of experiment 1) was replaced with the dot counting task described above. 
For short interruptions there were 3, 4 or 5 dots. For medium interruptions there were 7, 
8 or 9 dots. For long interruptions there were 11, 12 or 13 dots. In all cases participants 
were required to give a numeric answer, but that answer did not need to be correct for 
the resumption of the UNRAVEL task. As in experiment 1, participants were given 
practice on the interrupting task prior to the main experiment (again as part of the 
second block of practice trials) and feedback was given on the practice trials but not on 
the experimental trials. Also as with experiment 1, the experiment was approved by the 
departmental ethics committee prior to embarking on data collection. 
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3.2 Results 
All analyses proceeded as per experiment 1. 
3.2.1 UNRAVEL Accuracy and Response Time  
As for experiment 1, UNRAVEL trials with response time of greater than 20 seconds 
(less than 0.1% of trials) were excluded from analysis, as were those immediately 
following an interruption. On the remaining trials, accuracy was generally high (see 
figure 5, left), resulting in a negatively skewed distribution. As with experiment 1, a 
one-way within-subjects ANOVA on the accuracy data (arcsine transformed, to reduce 
skew) revealed no significant effect of response-stimulus interval (F(2, 78) = 1.594, p = 
0.210, 𝜂!! = 0.039). Also in agreement with experiment 1, response time decreased with 
response-stimulus interval, from a mean of 2658 msec to a mean of 2431 msec as 
response-stimulus interval increased from 0 msec to 500 msec (see figure 5, right), and 
a one-way within-subjects ANOVA revealed that the effect of response-stimulus 
interval on response time was significant (F(2, 78) = 10.361, p < 0.001, 𝜂!! = 0.210). 
Follow-up t-tests indicated that response time was significantly slower when response-
stimulus interval was 0 msec than when it was 250 msec (t(39) = 3.847, p < 0.001, two-
tailed) or 500 msec (t(39) = 4.113, p < 0.001, two-tailed). The difference between 
response time when the response-stimulus interval was 250 msec compared to when it 
was 500 msec did not reach significance (t(39) = 1.048, p = 0.301, two-tailed).  
A one-within ANOVA on the RT on correct baseline and post-interruption trials from 
blocks with RSI of 0 msec, revealed a significant effect of interruption length (F(3, 117) 
= 3.997, p = 0.009, 𝜂!! = 0.093). As in experiment 1, the rank order of mean response 
times reflected interruption length (2658 msec, 2862 msec, 3163 msec, 3315 msec for 
trials following no, short, medium and long interruptions). Mean RT following long 
interruptions was significantly longer than that following short interruptions (t(39) = 
2.117, p = 0.041, two-tailed) and baseline trials (t(39) = 3.803, p < 0.001, two-tailed).  
While mean post-interruption response times were again slower for short response-
stimulus intervals than for long response-stimulus intervals (3113 msec at 0 msec RSI 
versus 2959 msec at 500 msec RSI), a two-way within-subjects ANOVA revealed that 
the effect was not significant (main effect of response-stimulus interval: F(2, 78) = 
1.126, p = 0.329, 𝜂!! = 0.028). However, there was (as would be anticipated from the 
  
Figure 5: UNRAVEL accuracy (left) and response time (right), for trials not preceded by an 
interruption, as a function of response-stimulus interval in experiment 2. Error bars indicate 
one standard error. (cf. Figure 2.) 
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preceding analysis) an effect of interruption length (F(2, 78) = 10.710, p < 0.001, 𝜂!! = 
0.215) on post-interruption response time, with the longest interruptions leading to 
significantly longer response times than the shortest interruptions (3341 msec versus 
2795 msec; t(39) = 4.160, p < 0.001). Response-stimulus interval and interruption 
length did not interact in their effects on post-interruption response time (F(3.238, 
126.267) = 0.731, p = 0.545, 𝜂!! = 0.018). 
3.2.2 The Dot-Counting Task 
Responses of more than 4 seconds per dot were excluded from analysis of performance 
on the dot-counting task (a total of 4 responses, all from the same participant). Accuracy 
(i.e., the proportion of dot-counting trials where the participant’s answer was correct) 
and response times as a function of response-stimulus interval and interruption length 
are shown in figure 6. Interruption length affected accuracy (F(1.174, 45.777) = 12.300, 
p < 0.001, 𝜂!! = 0.240) and response time (F(2, 78) = 147.203, p < 0.001, 𝜂!! = 0.791), 
but response-stimulus interval did not (accuracy: F(2, 78) = 0.904, p = 0.409, 𝜂!! = 
0.023; response time: F(2, 78) = 0.005, p = 0.995, 𝜂!! = 0.000). The variables also did 
not interact (accuracy: F(2.764, 107.778) = 0.517, p = 0.656, 𝜂!! = 0.013; response time: 
F(4, 156) = 0.649, p = 0.629, 𝜂!! = 0.016).6 
Planned pair-wise comparisons confirmed that counting 12±1 dots took longer (mean: 
8516 msec) than counting 8±1 dots (mean: 5774 msec; t(39) ≥ 8.099, p < 0.001, in all 
cases), which took longer than counting 4±1 dots (mean: 3443 msec; t(39) ≥ 10.642, p < 
0.001, in all cases). Accuracy tended to be lower for longer interruptions (means: 94.4% 
for 12±1 dots, 98.9% for 8±1 dots, 99.7% for 4±1 dots), with accuracy on the longest 
interruptions being significantly lower than on the shortest interruptions, regardless of 
response-stimulus interval (t(39) ≥ 2.287 p ≤ 0.028, in all cases). 
As in experiment 1, the analysis of response time confirms that the manipulation of the 
number of dots to be counted was effective in yielding temporally longer interruptions, 
though unlike experiment 1, accuracy on longer interruptions tended to be lower than 
accuracy on shorter interruptions. This is not surprising given the nature of the 
                                                
6 Accuracy data in this analysis were arcsine transformed to reduce skew. 
  
Figure 6: Interruption task accuracy (left) and response time (right) as a function of 
response-stimulus interval and interruption length in experiment 2. Error bars indicate one 
standard error. (cf. Figure 3.)  
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interrupting task – participants were more likely to err when counting approximately 12 
dots than when counting approximately 4 dots. 
3.2.3 Sequence Errors on the UNRAVEL Task 
Figure 7 shows the proportion of errors of each type for baseline (i.e., non-interrupted) 
UNRAVEL trials (left) and post-interruption UNRAVEL trials (right, showing each 
level of interruption length) in experiment 2. As in the previous experiment, the number 
of opportunities to err in each cell of the experimental design (particularly following an 
interruption) was low. Therefore in both cases the data are pooled over response-
stimulus interval for clarity. Echoing the analysis of sequence errors for experiment 1 
and comparing P1 and A1 error rates (log transformed) as a function of the presence and 
length of preceding interruption, a 2 (error type) by 4 (interruption level) ANOVA 
revealed significant main effects of error type (F(1, 39) = 10.657, p = 0.002, 𝜂!! = 0.215) 
and interruption level (F(3, 117) = 17.038, p < 0.001, 𝜂!!  = 0.304), as well as a 
significant interaction (F(2.054, 80.119) = 3.692, p = 0.028, 𝜂!! = 0.086). Follow-up 
related t-tests comparing P1 and A1 error rates revealed a significant difference in favor 
of A1 errors on baseline trials (t(39) = –3.450, p = 0.001, two-tailed), a significant 
difference in favor of P1 errors following short interruptions (t(39) = 2.090, p = 0.043, 
  
  
Figure 7: Sequence error rates on baseline UNRAVEL trials (i.e., those not preceded by an 
interruption) (left) and on post-interruption UNRAVEL trials (right) in experiment 2. The 
upper panels show the data by response-stimulus interval (pooled over interruption duration 
in the upper right panel), while the lower panels show the data pooled over response-
stimulus interval. Error bars indicate one standard error. (cf. Figure 4.)   
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two-tailed) and medium interruptions (t(39) = 3.017, p = 0.004, two-tailed) but no 
significant difference between error types following long interruptions (t(39) = 1.577, p 
= 0.123, two-tailed). 
As in experiment 1, the second issue of concern relates to whether response-stimulus 
interval affects the rate of each type of sequence error, either on baseline trials or 
following an interruption. A 3 (response-stimulus interval) × 4 (interruption level: none, 
short, medium, long) multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) was performed on 
the (log transformed) proportions of each type of error (i.e., with six dependent 
measures: A1 errors, A2 errors, A3 errors, P1 errors, P2 errors and P3 errors). As was 
the case in experiment 1, this analysis revealed no significant interaction between 
response-stimulus interval and interruption length (Pillai’s Trace = 0.730, F(29, 11) = 
1.026, p = 0.510, 𝜂!! = 0.730) and no significant effect of response-stimulus interval 
(Pillai’s Trace = 0.291, F(12, 28) = 0.959, p = 0.508, 𝜂!! = 0.291). In contrast to the 
absence of effects related to response-stimulus interval, the effect of interruption length 
was significant (Pillai’s Trace = 0.673, F(18, 22) = 2.518, p = 0.021, 𝜂!! = 0.673). 
As with experiment 1, the results of this MANOVA must be interpreted with caution 
since the error data are sparse and skewed.7 Again, the critical findings relate to the lack 
of an effect of response-stimulus interval in the presence of an effect of interruption 
length. Analogous Bayesian analyses to those following experiment 1 support the null 
effect of RSI or its interaction with interruption length (see table 2), at least for those 
errors that occur with sufficient frequencies to allow interpretation of the results (P2, P1, 
and A1). Moreover, the fact that the critical results echo those of experiment 1 further 
raises confidence in their reliability. 
3.3 Discussion 
While there are some differences between the results of experiment 1 and experiment 2, 
the gross patterns are the same: a) response-stimulus interval affects RT measures on 
the UNRAVEL task but not sequence errors, while b) interruption length affects post-
interruption sequence errors, but c) the two manipulations do not interact in any analysis 
on any dependent measure. These findings support the view that the independent 
                                                
7 As in the case of experiment 1, reanalysis of the data excluding the no-interruption condition, i.e., via a 
3 × 3 MANOVAs, reduces the violation of homogeneity of variance but yields qualitatively equivalent 
results. 
 P3 P2 P1 A1 A2 A3 
RSI 0.046 0.021 0.019 0.035 0.166 0.026 
IL 0.267 6.708 2.3 × 106 9.269 0.400 0.011 
RSI × IL 4.4 × 10-4 1.5 × 10-4 0.002 0.004 0.004 1.3 × 10-4 
Table 2: Bayes Factors (BFInc) for inclusion of RSI, IL and their interaction in models of 
each sequence error type (experiment 2). Note that in situations where errors occur with 
sufficient frequency (P2, P1 and A1), the data provide strong evidence for models (BFInc >> 
1) with a single factor (Interruption Length). In contrast, the results provide evidence 
against models (BFInc << 1) that include RSI or the RSI × IL interaction term.  
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variables affect distinct aspects of task-set processing that operate independently in the 
control of behavior on the interrupted UNRAVEL task. 
The most obvious difference between the results of experiment 1 and experiment 2 
relates to performance on the interrupting task. Participants made more errors when 
counting dots than when copying letters, and accuracy on dot-counting was particularly 
poor when the number of dots was high. Notwithstanding this, the manipulation of the 
number of dots achieved its purpose – more dots resulted in longer interruptions.  
Turning to the interruption data, it is clear that the mean interruption length was 
somewhat shorter in experiment 2 (mean of 3443 msec, 5734 msec and 8516 msec for 
short, medium and long interruptions) than in experiment 1 (4895 msec, 8713 msec, and 
12268 msec, respectively). However, this difference in duration is not clearly mirrored 
in sequence error rates (e.g., 0.97%, 1.67% and 3.33% for A1 errors in experiment 2 
versus 0.83%, 1.67% and 4.03% for the equivalent in experiment 1). It appears that the 
interrupting task of experiment 2 produces slightly greater interference (per unit time of 
interruption) than that of experiment 1. This may be because the interrupting task in this 
experiment – dot counting – requires more cognitive processing than that of experiment 
1 – copying characters. Alternatively (or in addition), it may be because dot counting 
potentially has a sequential element (at least when there are many dots and the task 
cannot be completed by subitizing), and it may be that this places demands on place-
keeping, thus leading to greater interference. 
4 Experiment 3  
Experiments 1 and 2 show that the variables that affect place-keeping do not appear to 
affect set-shifting, and vice versa. They further suggest that these results are 
independent of the interrupting task. That is, not only are the processes supporting 
place-keeping and set-shifting independent or separable, but the nature of the 
interrupting task does not modulate the effects of either. Experiment 3 was designed to 
further explore this apparent independence of place-keeping and set-shifting by using a 
further interrupting task – in this case, a simple arithmetic task derived from that used in 
the study of interruptions by Botvinick and Bylsma (2005). In that study, participants 
repeatedly performed a relatively complex hierarchical sequential task (preparing 
instant coffee), with interruptions on 80% of trials. Interruptions were subtraction 
problems in which participants were required to calculate the change following a cash 
transaction (e.g., $5.00 tendered for a purchase of $1.60 → change is $3.40). In order to 
control the length of the interruption experiment 3 used simple 1 digit addition and 
subtraction, but varied the number of problems (from 1 to 3) in order to vary the 
interruption length. Use of the arithmetic interrupting task is further motivated by the 
question of whether interrupting tasks with no obvious sequential character (in contrast 
to the task of experiment 2) would lead to similar results. 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants 
Forty adult participants were recruited from Birkbeck’s volunteer panel (27 female, 
mean age 32.5 years; 13 male, mean age 28.8 years). Participants were paid £7.50 to 
complete the study and all participants’ data were included in the analyses. 
4.1.2 Design 
The design was the same as for experiments 1 and 2.  
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4.1.3 Interrupting Task: Single Digit Arithmetic 
In experiment 3 the interrupting task consisted of one, two or three single digit addition 
or subtraction problems (e.g., 7 – 3 = ?) presented in succession.  The problems 
appeared on screen and participants were required to type their response using the 
standard keyboard (and whichever fingers they chose) and then press the return key. As 
in the earlier experiments, participants were required to provide a response but that 
response was not required to be correct in order to proceed. Interrupting task accuracy 
was calculated as the proportion of arithmetic problems answered correctly within each 
interruption (i.e., 0/3, 1/3, 2/3, or 3/3). 
4.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to experiments 1 and 2 except that the interrupting task was 
replaced with the single-digit arithmetic task described above. On short interruption 
trials participants were asked to complete one single-digit arithmetic problem. On 
medium interruption trials two problems were presented in succession. On long 
interruption trials three problems were presented in succession. Participants were not 
informed of the number of arithmetic problems in any interruption – they were 
instructed to complete the arithmetic problems until an UNRAVEL stimulus reappeared. 
Thus, in contrast to experiments 1 and 2, pressing the return key did not always result in 
presentation of the next UNRAVEL stimulus.  
As in the previous experiments, participants were given practice on the interrupting task 
prior to the main experiment (again as part of the second block of practice trials), with 
feedback given on the practice trials but not on the experimental trials. Also as with 
previous experiments, prior to embarking on data collection the experiment received 
ethical approval from the departmental ethics committee. 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 UNRAVEL Accuracy and Response Time 
As with the previous experiments, UNRAVEL trials with response time of greater than 
20 seconds (less than 0.2% of trials) and those immediately preceded by an interruption 
were excluded from all analysis. On the remaining trials, accuracy was again generally 
high (see figure 8, left), resulting in a negatively skewed distribution. As in experiment 
1, a one-way within-subjects ANOVA on the accuracy data (arcsine transformed, to 
  
Figure 8: UNRAVEL accuracy (left) and response time (right), for trials not preceded by an 
interruption, as a function of response-stimulus interval in experiment 3. Error bars indicate 
one standard error. (cf. Figures 2 and 5.) 
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reduce skew) revealed no significant effect of response-stimulus interval (F(2, 78) = 
1.369, p = 0.260. 𝜂!! = 0.034). In agreement with both experiment 1 and experiment 2, 
response time decreased with response-stimulus interval, from a mean of 2581 msec to 
a mean of 2351 msec as response-stimulus interval increased from 0 msec to 500 msec 
(see figure 5, right), and a one-way within-subjects ANOVA confirmed that the effect 
of response-stimulus interval on response time was significant (F(2, 78) = 7.879, p = 
0.001, 𝜂!! = 0.168). Follow-up t-tests indicated that response time was significantly 
slower when the response-stimulus interval was 0 msec than when it was 500 msec 
(t(39) = 4.292, p < 0.001, two-tailed), as was the response time when the response-
stimulus interval was 250 msec compared to 500 msec (t(39) = 2.451, p = 0.019, two-
tailed). The difference between response time when the response-stimulus interval was 
0 msec compared to when it was 250 msec did not reach significance (t(39) = 1.295, p = 
0.203, two-tailed).  
A one-within ANOVA on the RT on correct baseline and post-interruption trials from 
blocks with RSI of 0 msec, revealed a significant effect of interruption length (F(3, 117) 
= 12.834, p < 0.001, 𝜂!! = 0.248). Mean RT on the UNRAVEL task was slower in trials 
preceded by a short, medium or long interruption (3215 msec, 3157 msec, 3239 msec) 
than in baseline trials (2581 msec; all t(39) > 4.917, p < 0.001, two-tailed), but 
interruption length did not affect RT. 
Mean post-interruption response times were again slower for short response-stimulus 
intervals than for long response-stimulus intervals (3084 msec at 0 msec RSI versus 
3211 msec at 500 msec RSI), but a two-way within-subjects ANOVA revealed that the 
effect was not significant (main effect of response-stimulus interval: F(1.703, 66.435) = 
1.421, p = 0.248, 𝜂!! = 0.035). The effect of interruption length on post-interruption 
response times was also not significant (F(2, 78) = 1.543, p = 0.220, 𝜂!! = 0.038), nor 
was the interaction between these variables (F(4, 156) = 1.621, p = 0.172, 𝜂!! = 0.040). 
4.2.2 The Arithmetic Task 
Responses of more than 10 seconds per arithmetic problem were excluded from analysis 
of performance on the arithmetic task (a total of 6 responses, 5 of which were from a 
single participant). Accuracy and response times as a function of response-stimulus 
  
Figure 9: Interruption task accuracy (left) and response time (right) as a function of 
response-stimulus interval and interruption length in experiment 3. Error bars indicate one 
standard error. (cf. Figures 3 and 6.)   
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interval and interruption length are shown in figure 9. Interruption length had a 
marginally significant effect on accuracy8 (F(2, 78) = 2.981, p = 0.057, 𝜂!! = 0.071) and 
a significant effect on response time (F(1.408, 54.906) = 317.531, p < 0.001, 𝜂!! = 
0.891). Response-stimulus interval did not affect either accuracy (F(2, 78) = 0.126, p = 
882, 𝜂!! = 0.003) or response time (F(2, 78) = 0.048, p = 0.953, 𝜂!! = 0.001). The 
independent variables also did not interact on either measure (accuracy: F(4, 156) = 
0.535, p = 0.710, 𝜂!! = 0.014; response time: F(2.978, 116.158) = 0.829, p = 0.480, 𝜂!! = 
0.021). 
Planned comparisons confirmed that completing 3 arithmetic problems took longer 
(mean: 6213 msec) than completing two (mean: 4452 msec; t(39) ≥ 9.684, p < 0.001 in 
all cases), which took longer than completing one (mean: 2560 msec; t(39) ≥ 11.456, p 
< 0.001, in all cases). As in the case of the earlier experiments, the analysis of response 
time confirms that the manipulation of the number of arithmetic problems was effective 
in yielding longer interruptions. Again, this is to be expected given the nature of the 
interrupting task.  
4.2.3 Sequence Errors on the UNRAVEL Task 
Figure 10 shows the proportion of errors of each type for baseline (i.e., non-interrupted) 
UNRAVEL trials (left) and post-interruption UNRAVEL trials (right, showing each 
level of interruption length) in experiment 3. As in figures 4 and 7, the upper panels 
show the (lack of) effect of response-stimulus interval while the data in the lower panels 
are pooled over response-stimulus interval for clarity. Echoing the analysis of sequence 
errors for the previous experiments, comparing P1 and A1 error rates (log transformed) 
as a function of the presence and length of preceding interruption, a 2 (error type) by 4 
(interruption level) ANOVA revealed no significant effect of error type (F(1, 39) = 
0.028, p = 0.867, 𝜂!! = 0.001), a main effect of interruption level (F(2.011, 78.441) = 
7.541, p < 0.001, 𝜂!! = 0.162), and no significant interaction (F(2.193, 85.518) = 1.808, 
p = 0.150, 𝜂!! = 0.044). Follow up related t-tests comparing P1 and A1 error rates (not 
licensed by the ANOVA, but reported for completeness and comparison with the 
previous studies) revealed a significant difference in favor of A1 errors on baseline 
trials (t(39) = –2.663, p = 0.011, two-tailed), but no significant difference following 
short interruptions (t(39) = –0.954, p = 0.346, two-tailed), medium interruptions (t(39) = 
0.784, p = 0.438, two-tailed), or long interruptions (t(39) = 1.409, p = 0.167, two-tailed). 
As in the previous experiments, a multivariate ANOVA with (log transformed) error 
type (P3, P2, P1, A1, A2, A3) as the dependent measures and response-stimulus interval 
(3 levels) and interruption length (4 levels: none, short, medium, long) as within-
subjects factors was conducted to determine whether interruption length affected the 
proportion of any error type (either singly or in conjunction with response-stimulus 
interval). There were no significant effects when all six dependent measures were 
entered into the MANOVA (interruption length: Pillai’s Trace = 0.513; F(16, 24) = 
1.581, p = 0.151, 𝜂!! = 0.513; response-stimulus interval: Pillai’s Trace = 0.304; F(10, 
30) = 1.313, p = 0.268. 𝜂!! = 0.304; the interaction between response-stimulus interval 
and interruption length: Pillai’s Trace = 0.561; F(23, 17) = 0.944, p = 0.559, 𝜂!! = 
0.561). Note however that the durations of interruptions in this experiment were lower 
than in experiments 1 and 2. Post-interruption error rates were correspondingly lower, 
with few errors occurring at offsets of greater than 1. A MANOVA restricted to just P1 
                                                
8 Accuracy data were again arcsine transformed prior to analysis to reduce skew. 
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and A1 error types yielded a significant effect of interruption length (Pillai’s Trace = 
0.347; F(6, 34) = 3.015, p = 0.018, 𝜂!! = 0.347) but no significant effect of response-
stimulus interval (Pillai’s Trace = 0.158; F(4, 36) = 1.685, p = 0.175, 𝜂!! = 0.158) and 
no interaction between the factors (Pillai’s Trace = 0.267; F(12, 28) = 0.849, p = 0.604, 𝜂!! = 0.267). 
Following the Bayesian analyses of experiments 1 and 2, a series of Bayesian repeated 
measures analyses of variance were conducted using the JASP package (JASP Team, 
2018; Version 0.8.5.1), with response-stimulus interval and interruption length as 
within-subjects factors. Bayes factors for inclusion of each term in the various models 
are shown in Table 3. The low error rates limits interpretation of the results, but for the 
two most frequent types of errors (P1 and A1) there is (respectively) extremely strong 
and anecdotal evidence for an effect of interruption length on error production in the 
presence of strong evidence against an effect of response-stimulus interval or an 
interaction between the factors. While these results are less strong than those of 
experiments 1 and 2, in that they do not relate to errors at each offset, they nevertheless 
further bolster the results of experiment 1 and experiment 2 concerning a) the absence 
of any relation between response-stimulus interval and sequence errors, and b) the 
  
  
Figure 10: Sequence error rates on baseline UNRAVEL trials (i.e., those not preceded by an 
interruption) (left) and on post-interruption UNRAVEL trials (right) in experiment 3. The 
upper panels show the data by response-stimulus interval (pooled over interruption duration 
in the upper right panel), while the lower panels show the data pooled over response-
stimulus interval. Error bars indicate one standard error. (cf. Figures 4 and 7.)     
 
To appear in Cognitive Psychology 
27 
 
tendency for longer interruptions to result in more one-step errors than shorter 
interruptions, and more P1 errors than A1 errors. 
4.3 Discussion 
The results of experiment 3 support the key claims made on the basis of experiments 1 
and 2, namely that a) the effect of an interrupting task on sequence errors is to increase 
the probability of perseverative errors more than that of anticipatory errors, b) the 
effects of interruptions are quantitatively more pronounced but not qualitatively 
different for longer interruptions, and c) the processes that support set-shifting are 
primarily sensitive to RSI and not interruption length, while the processes that support 
place-keeping are sensitive to interruption length but not RSI. 
The mean duration of interruptions in experiment 3 (2560 msec, 4452 msec and 6214 
msec for short, medium and long interruptions, respectively) was less than that of the 
earlier experiments, but the effect on sequence errors was similar to that of experiment 2. 
Thus the longest interruptions in experiment 3 (of mean duration 6.214 seconds) led to a 
total sequence error rate of 6.4%, compared with a medium interruption in experiment 2 
(of mean duration 5.774 seconds) that led to a total sequence error rate of 5.8%. 
Differences between the interrupting tasks of experiments 2 and 3 therefore do not 
appear to have substantially impacted sequence error rates. This suggests that the 
interference from dot-counting in experiment 2 is more related to the cognitive aspects 
of the dot-counting task, rather than to its possible involvement of place-keeping, 
though clearly additional data that directly speaks to this issue is needed to fully 
adjudicate between these possibilities. 
A second distinctive feature of experiment 3 compared to the earlier experiments is that 
response time on post-interruption trials was not dependent on interruption length: all 
levels of interruption length led to a similar lengthening of response times of 
approximately 600 msec in comparison to baseline trials. One possible reason for the 
lack of an effect of interruption length in this experiment is that, in contrast to the earlier 
experiments, participants could not be sure when pressing the return key during an 
interruption that they would subsequently be presented with an UNRAVEL stimulus – 
frequently they would be presented with another arithmetic problem. Consequently this 
experiment may provide a more pure measure of the time cost of recovering from an 
interruption than that provided by the earlier experiments. 
 P3 P2 P1 A1 A2 A3 
RSI 0.052 0.060 0.030 0.028 0.022 0.048 
IL 0.020 0.018 5665.833 1.735 0.010 0.021 
RSI × IL 2.7 × 10-4 7.1 × 10-4 0.003 6.4 × 10-4 1.1 × 10-4 2.8 × 10-4 
Table 3: Bayes Factors (BFInc) for inclusion of RSI, IL and their interaction in models of 
each sequence error type (experiment 3). While the low rates of P3, P2, A2 and A3 errors 
limit interpretation, there is strong evidence for an effect of interruption length on P1 (BFInc 
>> 1) and anecdotal evidence for the effect on A1 errors. In contrast (and where 
interpretable), the results provide strong evidence against models (BFInc << 1) that include 
RSI or the RSI × IL interaction term.  
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The fact that, in this experiment, pressing the return key on completion of an 
interrupting arithmetic problem did not predictably lead to resumption of the 
UNRAVEL task also speaks to another potential interpretation of participant 
performance. In experiments 1 and 2 it is possible that participants might, on 
completion of the interrupting task (typing the letters or entering the count of the 
number of dots) pause and attempt to recall their position in the UNRAVEL task before 
pressing the return key and resuming the UNRAVEL task. Our primary evidence for the 
position presented here is post-interruption sequence errors, rather than post-
interruption response times, and so if participants were to adopt this strategy it would 
not undermine our theoretical position. However, the strategy is not effective in the 
current experiment. At the same time, all previous critical results hold, suggesting that, 
if such a strategy is used in the earlier experiments, it does not affect the critical 
findings. 
5 Interim Discussion and Additional Analyses 
5.1 Summary and Interpretation of Results 
Across three experiments we have shown that while increasing response-stimulus 
interval (RSI) reduces response time on the UNRAVEL task, it does not affect the 
number or type of errors following an interruption. This was true for all levels and types 
of interruption investigated. At the same time, RSI does affect response time on the 
UNRAVEL task in precisely the way one would anticipate if performance of the 
UNRAVEL task relies on the same mechanisms underlying the performance of more 
standard set-shifting tasks. That is, UNRAVEL response times are faster at longer RSIs, 
but the decrease in response time with increasing RSI does not fully reflect the increase 
in RSI, meaning that longer RSIs appear to allow some, but not all, processes required 
for set-shifting (e.g., disengagement of the previous task-set or activation of the 
forthcoming task-set) to be carried out during the response-stimulus interval. 
In addition, across all tasks, long interruptions led (unsurprisingly) to more post-
interruption sequence errors, and replicating previous work, post-interruption sequence 
errors tended to be perseverative rather than anticipatory, with long interruptions 
resulting in disproportionately more perseverative than anticipatory errors. Critically, 
however, there was no evidence from any of the three studies that this finding is 
modulated by RSI. That is, while longer RSI reduces response time on the UNRAVEL 
task, it does not translate into fewer sequence errors on that task, either in the baseline 
condition or following an interruption. This contrasts with the view that longer RSIs 
might allow some degree of task-set configuration to occur prior to an interruption, 
which facilitates place-keeping, and thereby reduces the rate of affect post-interruption 
sequence errors. The implication is that, at some level, the processes supporting task-set 
reconfiguration and place-keeping operate on distinct representations of task-set. 
One potential concern with the above interpretations is that the factorial design of each 
experiment meant that there were relatively few interruptions of each duration at each 
level of RSI, and hence relatively few opportunities for post-interruption error. Given 
that the findings were consistent across all three experiments, that in most cases the 
critical F ratios were less than one, and that our interpretation is supported by the 
Bayesian analyses, we consider it unlikely that the results are due to a lack of power, 
though it is possible that the manipulation of RSI is simply too weak to allow a 
detectable effect on sequence errors. Recall however that all three experiments took the 
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same form and that all three yielded directly comparable datasets. In order to increase 
statistical power and confidence in our interpretation we therefore conducted further 
analyses collapsing the data across all experiments (and using experiment as a between-
subjects factor in the analyses). 
For direct comparison with the earlier results, a 3 (experiment) × 3 (response-stimulus 
interval) × 4 (interruption level: none, short, medium, long) multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) was performed on the (log transformed) proportions of each type 
of error (i.e., with six dependent measures: A1 errors, A2 errors, A3 errors, P1 errors, 
P2 errors and P3 errors) across the three experiments. Consistent with previous results, 
this analysis revealed no significant interaction between response-stimulus interval and 
interruption length (Pillai’s Trace = 0.252, F(35, 83) = 0.798, p = 0.770, 𝜂!! = 0.252) 
and no significant effect of response-stimulus interval (Pillai’s Trace = 0.075, F(12, 
106) = 0.716, p = 0.733, 𝜂!! = 0.075). In contrast to the absence of effects related to 
response-stimulus interval, the effect of interruption length was significant (Pillai’s 
Trace = 0.555, F(18, 100) = 6.932, p < 0.001, 𝜂!! = 0.555). In addition, within this 
analysis the three-way interaction between response-stimulus interval, interruption 
length and experiment was not significant (Pillai’s Trace = 0.663, F(70, 168) = 1.190, p 
= 0.184, 𝜂!!  = 0.331), nor was the two-way interaction between response-stimulus 
interval and experiment (Pillai’s Trace = 0.258, F(24, 214) = 1.323, p = 0.151, 𝜂!!  = 
0.129), or the two-way interaction between interruption length and experiment (Pillai’s 
Trace = 0.334, F(36, 202) = 1.167, p = 0.250, 𝜂!! = 0.172). However, the main effect of 
experiment was significant (Pillai’s Trace = 0.175, F(12, 226) = 1.803, p = 0.049, 𝜂!! = 
0.087). This latter effect reflects the fact that participants in experiment 1 made more 
errors than those in experiment 2, who made more errors than those in experiment 3, 
presumably because the interruption duration (for all three levels of interruption) was 
greater in experiment 1 than in experiment 2, and greater in experiment 2 than in 
experiment 3.  
UNRAVEL response times as a function of interruption length also afford a cross-
experiment analysis. In particular, in each of the preceding experiments we observed 
that UNRAVEL response time on post-interruption trials decreased with increasing 
interruption length, though in all three cases the effect was not significant. The 
increased power obtained by analyzing across experiments, however, suggests that the 
effect is real. Thus a 3 way ANOVA on post-interruption response time on the 
UNRAVEL task, with RSI (0 msec, 250 msec, 500 msec) and interruption duration 
(short, medium or long) as within-subjects factors and experiment (1, 2 and 3) as a 
between-subjects factor, revealed that not only is the main effect of interruption length 
significant (F(1.877, 219.581) = 20.765, p < 0.001, 𝜂!!  = 0.151), but that the main effect 
of RSI is also significant (F(1.903, 222.608) = 4.156, p = 0.018, 𝜂!!  = 0.034). The only 
other significant effect from this analysis relates to the interaction between interruption 
length and experiment (F(3.754, 219.581) = 2.634, p = 0.038, 𝜂!!   = 0.043). The 
significant effect of RSI on post-interruption response time is intriguing as it suggests 
that processing related to set-shifting prior to the interruption can carry over through the 
duration of the interruption. This effect argues against an account that attempts to 
explain our findings purely in terms of dissipation of task set throughout the duration of 
the response-stimulus interval and the interrupting task. The response-stimulus interval 
is generally small compared to the interruption length, and so the additional dissipation 
of task set due to variation of the RSI (by up to 500 msec) in addition to the interruption 
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interval (of over 12 seconds in the long-interruption condition of experiment 1) would 
be expected to be minimal, and would not be expected to affect post-interruption 
response time. Rather, the effect suggests some form of task-set preparation during the 
response-stimulus interval (prior to an interruption) which primes the upcoming task-set, 
with that priming persisting over the interruption interval. However, that priming 
(which would presumably be greater for longer RSI) does not modulate the post-
interruption sequence error rate. 
5.2 Implications for Information Processing Models of Set-Shifting and 
Place-Keeping 
The implications of our results for the relationship between the cognitive processes that 
support set-shifting and place-keeping may be clarified by considering current 
theoretical accounts of those processes (or equivalently, the mechanisms held to give 
rise to set-shifting and place-keeping effects). Consider first set-shifting. While there are 
several information processing accounts of the effects of RSI on response time in set-
shifting tasks, those accounts share some key features. Gilbert and Shallice (2002), for 
example, build on the influential interactive activation model of Stroop effects of Cohen 
et al. (1990). The Gilbert and Shallice model comprises input units for each value of 
each critical dimension of the stimulus, response units for each response, and task 
demand units which effectively amplify or prime the input units of the dimension (or 
dimensions) relevant to the current task. In the paradigm of interest, a task cue is first 
presented (indicating which task is to be performed) and subsequently a stimulus is 
presented. The interval between task cueing and stimulus presentation is manipulated. 
When this interval is non-zero, task demand units can accumulate activation prior to 
presentation of a stimulus. This leads to relatively fast response times when the stimulus 
is eventually presented, but the activation of task demand units is not instantaneous. 
Hence longer cue/stimulus intervals allow greater accumulation of task demand unit 
activation prior to stimulus presentation than shorter cue/stimulus intervals, and this is 
why, according to the model, increasing the cue/stimulus interval results in shorter 
response times once the stimulus is actually presented. 
Altmann and Gray (2008) present an alternative model of set-shifting in which task 
control codes play a similar role to the task demand units of Cohen et al. (1990) and 
Gilbert and Shallice (2002). Like task demand units, task control codes are held to have 
associated activation values, but in the Altmann and Gray model task control codes are 
held in episodic memory, and a task control code’s activation value determines whether 
it can be recalled. On stimulus presentation, the model attempts to recall the current task 
control code and then uses that code to generate an appropriate response. The recall 
process may need to be performed multiple times if it fails to produce a task control 
code. Increasing the cue/stimulus interval effectively allows task control codes to be 
activated prior to stimulus presentation, increasing the likelihood that recall of the 
current task control code will be effective. The account thus shares important features 
with that of De Jong (2000). 
While there are theoretical differences between these two models of cue/stimulus 
presentation interval effects, they both propose that behavior is controlled by task-
specific control units or codes, and that the activation of these units/codes increases 
during the interval between cue presentation and stimulus presentation. Within our 
version of the UNRAVEL task, this interval corresponds to the response-stimulus 
interval, as responding to one stimulus implicitly cues the next step of the UNRAVEL 
task sequence. 
To appear in Cognitive Psychology 
31 
 
Building upon the model of Altmann and Gray (2008), Altmann and Trafton (2015) 
propose a two-stage model – the remember-advance model – of performance on the 
UNRAVEL task, and of place-keeping more generally. In this model each step of the 
UNRAVEL task has an associated control code. These are the same control codes 
postulated in the model of Altmann and Gray. On each step, the most active control 
code is recalled from episodic memory (as in the Altmann and Gray model). This is the 
“remember” stage of the remember-advance model. Typically the recalled control code 
will be the control code for the most recently completed step. That control code is then 
used to generate the control code for the current step (the “advance” stage), which is 
then executed, leaving a trace in episodic memory. Decay operates on the traces of 
control codes in episodic memory, so the most recent trace is normally the most active, 
but retrieval is also subject to noise, meaning that the remember stage may retrieve the 
trace of an earlier control code, rather than that of the most recent control code. This is 
held to be the root of perseverative errors. Generation of the control code for the current 
step relies on activation spreading from the retrieved control code to subsequent control 
codes – a process that is held to operate through directed associative links between 
successive control codes. So in the UNRAVEL task associative links will result in 
activation spreading from the U control code to the N control code, and from the N 
control code to the R control code, and so on. Activation spreads along chains of links, 
meaning that, for example, the U control code will activate the N control code which 
will activate the R control unit and so on, but the strength of the links is held to be less 
than 1, so if the U control code is the outcome of the remember stage, the N control 
code will be the most active at the advance stage, though noise in this process may 
result in the R control code (or even the A control code) being selected. This is held to 
be the cause of anticipation errors. 
In support of their model, Altmann and Trafton (2015) report a study of interruptions in 
the UNRAVEL task where 1 second lags were added between steps, with probability of 
0.5. Participants made fewer perseverative errors when interrupted following a lag than 
when interrupted on a no-lag trial. Altmann and Trafton suggest that these lags allow 
participants to effectively consolidate the most recently completed control code, thereby 
ensuring that such codes are more accurately recalled, and thereby reducing the rate of 
perseverative errors. The self-report of participants supports this account. 
While the remember-advance model can provide an adequate account of several 
empirical effects, it lacks parsimony: perseverative and anticipatory errors are held to 
arise from separate mechanisms. Other models of sequential behavior in other domains 
(e.g., the model of serial recall of Burgess & Hitch, 1999) view both types of error as 
resulting from a single mechanism – a noisy representation of task or temporal context 
where nearby elements (both past and future) have similar (and hence confusable) 
representations. Similarity of these representations is held to result in the activation of 
the representations of nearby elements, with the level of activation depending on the 
similarity of task or temporal context. Within a model of UNRAVEL, such a 
mechanism would naturally result in error “gradients”, with P1 errors more likely than 
P2 errors, and P2 errors more likely than P3 errors, and similarly with A1 errors more 
likely than A2 errors, and A2 errors more likely than A3 errors. However, as Altmann et 
al. (2014) point out, a single mechanism account does not sit well with asymmetries in 
perseverative and anticipatory errors, as observed both in their original study and as 
replicated here (cf. figures 4, 7 and 10), and indeed as observed in the study of lags by 
Altmann and Trafton (2015). 
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The data presented here, however, appear to present a difficulty for the remember-
advance model, particularly if the task control codes of that model are identified with 
the task control codes of the model of Altmann and Gray (2008). Note that both models 
assume such codes are stored in episodic memory, that they have associated activation 
values, and that successful task performance requires recall of an appropriate task 
control code. The difficulty is that this approach would imply that increasing the RSI in 
the UNRAVEL task should result in greater activation of task control codes (both in 
general and prior to an interruption), and hence greater resistance to perseverative 
sequence errors, both during baseline performance and following an interruption. Our 
data instead suggest a separation between task control codes and the units responsible 
for priming responses when RSI is varied, with the activation of the units responsible 
for priming responses being inaccessible to the mechanisms that activate task control 
codes. 
A further issue, somewhat orthogonal to the above, concerns the main effect of RSI on 
post-interruption RT found in the final cross-experiment analysis. This is worthy of 
special consideration given that post-interruption trials were not immediately preceded 
by a response-stimulus interval. (Recall that the interval occurred after the preceding 
UNRAVEL trial and before the interruption, but not after the interruption.) This is the 
only analysis that supports an effect of RSI that persists throughout the interruption 
period. It appears that processing after the preceding UNRAVEL trial but before the 
interruption leaves the cognitive system in a state of heightened readiness for the post-
interruption UNRAVEL trial. Critically, however, this does not translate into a 
reduction in post-interruption errors. In other words, this analysis also supports the 
interpretation that place-keeping and set-shifting effects arise from separate task-set 
representations. The task-set representation that persists during the interruption period 
does not appear to be accessible to the mechanisms that support place-keeping. 
A final puzzle concerning these models and datasets is that our results (i.e., that there is 
no effect of increasing RSI on sequence error rates) might seem to contradict the results 
of Altmann and Trafton (2015), where (as noted) adding lags before some UNRAVEL 
trials led to a reduction in perseverative errors when a lag was followed by an 
interruption. One possibility is that the irregular nature of Altmann and Trafton’s task 
encouraged the use of a rehearsal or consolidation strategy on lag trials (as reported by 
their participants), while this strategy was not encouraged by the more regular / 
rhythmic nature of our procedure. Another possibility is that our maximum response-
stimulus interval (of 500 msec) was simply too short to make this deliberate strategy 
viable. 
5.3 An Alternative Account 
Our data, together with past results, suggest some critical features required of an 
integrated model of set-shifting and place-keeping. First, the data suggest separable 
codes for tracking one’s position in a task and for controlling task-set engagement when 
shifting from one set to another. Altmann and Trafton’s (2015) work suggests that the 
former are open to deliberate rehearsal, and so one possibility is that these are 
maintained within a high-level deliberative control system (e.g., a task-general working 
memory, or possibly the supervisory system, of Norman & Shallice, 1986). Equally 
there is reason to believe that the latter are not accessible to deliberate processes, and 
within the dual-systems architecture of Norman and Shallice (1986) these would 
presumably be located within the contention scheduling system (i.e., a lower-level 
system responsibly for the execution of routine behavior, potentially but not necessarily 
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under indirect control of the supervisory system). Critically, activation of 
representations in the contention scheduling system is not directly accessible to the 
supervisory system. 
Second, the gradient over error rates, described in the previous section, suggests that 
place-keeping may rely on a noisy representation of task or temporal context where 
nearby steps have similar representations, as employed, for example, in the memory 
model of Burgess and Hitch (1999).9. The asymmetry in error types, we suggest, arises 
not through distinct mechanisms for retrieval of episodic task control codes and 
advancing to the next step, but through this noisy representation of task context, 
combined with a (possibly deliberate) mechanism for “ticking off” or inhibiting recently 
completed steps. Interruptions, we suggest, disrupt both the representation of temporal 
context, leading to a general increase in sequence errors, and this inhibitory mechanism 
(which normally prevents perseverative errors), leading to an increase in perseverative 
errors.  
Finally, we assume that the place-keeping mechanism is event-based rather than time-
based, such that updating of the context signal is dependent upon the occurrence of 
events (e.g., generation of a response) rather than time (cf. Koch et al., 2010). In 
contrast, activation-based processing at the lower level is, we assume, time-based 
(following Gilbert & Shallice, 2002, and related models). These assumptions mean that 
place-keeping will be adversely affected by intervening tasks but not by a lengthening 
of the response-stimulus interval. In contrast set-shifting will be facilitated by 
increasing the response-stimulus interval, which effectively allows disengagement of 
previous task sets and/or, in a predictable task, priming or preparation of the upcoming 
task-set. 
6 A Model of Place-Keeping and Set-Shifting in the UNRAVEL Task 
In order to demonstrate the viability of the above alternative account, and to specify it 
more fully, this section presents a detailed computational implementation of the account, 
together with simulations of the key findings from the empirical work reported above. 
We take a step-wise approach, beginning by extending the model of task switching of 
Gilbert and Shallice (2002) to the seven UNRAVEL subtasks, and assuming perfect 
place-keeping but no interruptions. We then extend the model with our proposed place-
keeping mechanism before considering how this mechanism (and the lower-level 
mechanisms that are hypothesized to give rise to set-shifting effects) is affected by 
interruptions of varying length.  
6.1 Extending the Gilbert and Shallice (2002) Model to the UNRAVEL 
Task 
As discussed above, Gilbert and Shallice (2002) present a model of switching between 
two tasks (color naming and word reading in Stroop). The model shown in figure 11, 
which we refer to as Model A, presents a direct extension of this model to the 
UNRAVEL task. Model A consists of three banks of units: 14 input units (organized as 
7 pairs of units, corresponding to the 7 dimensions of an UNRAVEL stimulus); 14 
                                                
9 This is also consistent with supplementary analyses of the results from the current experiments, where 
in all cases strong positive correlations were observed between the rates of post-interruption anticipatory 
and perseverative errors (r = 0.497, 0.306, 0.562, and p = 0.001, 0.055, 0.001, for experiments 1, 2 and 3 
respectively, with N = 40 in all cases). Such correlations are suggestive of a common mechanism behind 
both types of error. 
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output units, corresponding to the 14 possible responses in the UNRAVEL task and 
again organized as 7 pairs of units, with each pair corresponding to the one UNRAVEL 
subtasks; and 7 task demand units (corresponding to the 7 UNRAVEL subtasks). Each 
unit has an activation value that varies over time, as in the original model, between –1 
and +1, as a result of excitation and inhibition from connected units. Input units are 
connected to corresponding output units, and output units are bidirectionally connected 
to corresponding task demand units. In addition, lateral inhibition operates within each 
pair of output units and between task demand units. Task demand units also inhibit 
output units corresponding to other tasks. These connections are reciprocal, with output 
units associated with each task inhibiting the task demand units for the other tasks. 
Model A differs from the model of Gilbert and Shallice (2002) in that a) there are seven 
tasks instead of two, b) each task has two output units, corresponding to each binary 
stimulus dimension, and c) trainable connections between input units and task demand 
units are not included. With respect to the last of these differences, Gilbert and Shallice 
(2002) include trainable connections from input units to task demand units in their 
model in order to model item-specific effects. These connections have been excluded 
because such effects are not the focus of the current discussion. In all other respects, 
including the calculation of activation and the propagation of activation throughout a 
trial, Model A is a direct translation of the Gilbert and Shallice (2002) model to the 
UNRAVEL task. (See the appendix for full details.) 
Model A requires specification of task-specific top-down control input strengths and 
task-specific input to output connection strengths. In order to achieve modest rates of 
task errors (e.g., responding ‘U’ on a U/I discrimination subtask when the correct 
response was ‘I’) similar to those of participants on the UNRAVEL task (i.e., around 
1%), the former were set to random values between 14.0 and 16.0 while the latter were 
set to values between 0.9 and 1.0. With these task-specific parameter values, and lateral 
inhibition set to 4.0 (in contrast to 2.0 of the original model), the bias on task-demand 
units set to –10 and the bias on output units set to –9 (in contrast to –4 and –6, 
respectively, in the original model, to reflect the increased number of task demand 
 
Figure 11: Model A: A model of the subtasks of UNRAVEL, based on the task switching 
model of Gilbert and Shallice (2002).  
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units10), the model is able to perform each of the UNRAVEL sub-tasks. Moreover, if the 
top-down control units are activated in sequence, it is able to perform the uninterrupted 
UNRAVEL task in its entirety. 
Figure 12 (left panel) shows the effect of varying RSI on the response time of Model A, 
with all parameters beyond those mentioned above set to the values given in Gilbert and 
Shallice (2002). The rates of each type of sequence error as a function or RSI are shown 
in figure 12 (right panel). It is clear from figure 12 that while Model A successfully 
reproduces the observed effect of RSI on response time (cf. figure 12, left panel, and 
figures 2, 5, and 8, right panels), it also produces an effect of RSI on sequence errors in 
the non-interrupted UNRAVEL task, with more perseverative errors at short RSI than at 
long RSI. The latter is inconsistent with our empirical results. 
The effect of RSI on sequence errors in the non-interrupted UNRAVEL task is a result 
of carryover of task demand activation from one trial to the next – a feature of the 
Gilbert and Shallice (2002) model that the authors include in order to account for the 
effects of differential task difficulty and item-specificity on switch costs. In their model, 
a small proportion (20%) of task demand unit activity is retained from one trial to next. 
In the context of the UNRAVEL task this means, for example, that at the beginning of, 
say, a ‘V’ trials the activity of the ‘A’ task demand unit will be initialized to 
approximately 0.2 (rather than 0.0), given that the ‘A’ task demand unit will have been 
near its maximum (of 1.0) at the end of the previous trial. This predisposes Model A to 
perseverative errors. Note in particular that this activity is more disruptive when the RSI 
                                                
10 The negative bias on units effectively implements tonic inhibition. More negative bias is required to 
prevent over-excitation in the system when additional task demand and output units are added. 
  
 
Figure 12: Predictions of Model A. Left panel: Effect of RSI on response time (measured in 
processing cycles). Right panel: Effect of RSI on the percentage of different types of sequence 
error in uninterrupted trials of the UNRAVEL task. The data are based on 40 virtual 
participants, with parameters set as in Gilbert and Shallice (2002) except where explicitly 
mentioned in the text. Sequential subtask selection was controlled by an error-free mechanism 
that took 50 processing cycles on each trial to select the appropriate subtask. Error-bars 
represent one standard error about the mean.  
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is small than when it is large. Note also that the model produces negligible rates of 
anticipatory errors at all values of RSI. Increasing task demand carryover yields a 
gradient of perseverative errors, with P2 errors also occurring but at lower rates than P1 
errors, while decreasing it reduces the number of perseverative errors at all values of 
RSI. Setting task demand carryover to 0% (instead of 20%) completely eliminates 
sequence errors of all types in Model A’s behavior. 
6.2 Augmenting the Model with a Place-Keeping Mechanism 
To model place-keeping we introduce two additional banks of units, as shown in figure 
13 – a bank of Temporal Context units, which maintain a noisy representation of the 
current place in a sequential task, and a bank of Task History units, which maintain a 
memory of recently completed tasks. These combine to activate Task Context units, 
which are equated with the Top Down Control Input units of figure 11. We calculate 
activation of units in the three banks as follows: 
In the case of Temporal Context units, which have one-to-one connections with their 
corresponding Task Context units, activation at the beginning of a block of UNRAVEL 
trials is initialized to: 𝑇𝐶! = 𝛼,𝛼 ∙ (1− 𝛼) ! , if  𝑖 = 1  (i.e., the first task) where 𝑑 is the number of steps between 𝑖 and the first task 
 
In this equation, α is a parameter (which we refer to as the temporal acuity) which 
controls the “sharpness” of the Temporal Context signal. When α is 1.0, the first 
Temporal Context unit is fully activated and all others have activation of 0.0. When α is 
less than 1.0, activation is concentrated on the first unit, but nearby units are also 
slightly active. For example, when α is 0.75, unit 1 will be set to 0.750, units 2 and 7 
will be set to 0.106, units 3 and 6 will be set to 0.068, and units 4 and 5 will be set to 
0.047.11 After each step (i.e., immediately following the generation of a response and in 
                                                
11 The square root factor in the equation is designed to ensure activity of nearby units does not drop off 
too quickly with increasing distance. 
 
Figure 13:  Place-keeping components of Model B, where the Task Context Units are identified 
with the corresponding Top Down Control Input Units of Model A (see figure 11). Temporal 
Context units excite corresponding Task Context units, while Task History units inhibit 
corresponding Task Context units. The strength of connections is shown in table 4. The shading 
of the units shows their activity when the system is about to perform the ‘A’ subtask 
(immediately after having successfully completed the ‘R’ subtask).  
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preparation for the next step), the Temporal Context signal is shifted one unit to the 
right. 
In the case of Task History units, activations are initialized to zero, but following each 
step of the task (i.e., immediately following the generation of a response and in 
preparation for the next step), the unit corresponding to that task is set to a value given 
by the parameter ρ (Task History persistence), and the activation of all other Task 
History units is multiplied by ρ. Thus, if ρ is 0.50, after completion of the first step the 
first Task History unit will be set to 0.50, while all others will be zero. After the second 
step, the first Task History unit will be 0.25, the second will be 0.50, and all others will 
be zero, and so on. 
In the case of Task Context units, activation is calculated according to the interactive 
activation equations used in Model A (i.e., that of Gilbert and Shallice, 2002; see the 
appendix). As in that model, activation calculation is governed by a set of parameters. A 
complete listing of the parameters and their values for the place-keeping component of 
the model are given in table 4. Beyond those already discussed, the place-keeping 
component includes a noise parameter (whose value is larger than that in the set-shifting 
network), a step size parameter (whose value is the same as that in the set-shifting 
network), and a response threshold. In contrast to the set-shifting mechanisms, we 
assume selection of a Task Context unit (and subsequent excitation of the appropriate 
Task Demand unit in Model A) occurs when a Task Context unit’s activation exceeds a 
threshold of 0.90. This typically yields a selection decision in 40 to 60 processing cycles. 
One final parameter is the task update probability (υ). This is the probability that, 
following completion of a subtask, updating of Temporal Context and Task History 
units takes place. In other words, we assume that participants occasionally fail to update 
their place-keeping representations following generation of a response and in 
preparation of the next UNRAVEL step. 
The graphs in figure 14 show the effect of the proposed place-keeping mechanisms on 
mean baseline response time (left panel) and the different types of sequence error (right 
panel) for three levels of response-stimulus interval. These graphs were generated with 
Parameter Value 
Temporal acuity (α) 0.75 
Task History persistence (ρ) 0.50 
Temporal Context to Task Context weight 50.0 
Task History to Task Context weight 15.0 
Task Context noise (s.d.) 0.050 
Task Context lateral inhibition 0 
Task Context selection threshold 0.90 
Step size 0.015 
Task update probability (υ) 0.99 
Table 4: Place-keeping parameters and their values used to generate figure 14.  
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the place-keeping parameters set to the values given in table 4 and all aspects of Model 
A as in the earlier simulations. Note in particular that the full model (without 
considering interruption trials) produces the requisite decrease in response times as 
response-stimulus interval increases, together with gradients over both anticipatory and 
perseverative errors that are independent of response-stimulus interval. Moreover, while 
the Temporal Context units provide excitation to Task Context units that is symmetric 
about the current task, the inhibitory connections from Task History units serve to bias 
the system slightly towards anticipatory, and away from perseverative, sequence errors. 
6.3 Modeling the Effect of Interruptions 
We have proposed that the effect of an interruption is to degrade the representations of 
Temporal Context and Task History. Within the model there are multiple ways in which 
each of these might be achieved. Figure 15 shows the effect (for different values of 
response-stimulus interval) on sequence errors of decreasing temporal acuity (α) in the 
Temporal Context units and decreasing the persistence (ρ) of Task History units. In 
broad terms the left panel shows the simulated effect of short interruptions while the 
right panel shows the simulated effect of long interruptions (cf. figure 14, right panel).  
Decreasing the acuity of the Temporal Context signal results in less focused activation 
of the correct Task Context unit, and an increase in activation of nearby Task Context 
units. Decreasing the persistence of Task History units lessens their suppressing effect 
on perseverative errors. When that effect is sufficiently reduced (figure 15, right panel), 
perseverative errors dominate anticipatory errors, largely because of the model’s 
occasional failure to advance steps, as given by the υ parameter. Indeed, similar effects 
may be obtained by keeping persistence fixed and decreasing υ. The model therefore 
does not directly speak to the issue of whether interruptions affect the representation of 
subtask history or the updating of position in task. 
  
Figure 14: Predictions of Model B. Left panel: Effect of RSI on response time (measured in 
processing cycles). Right panel: Effect of RSI on the percentage of different types of 
sequence error in uninterrupted trials of the UNRAVEL task. The data are based on 40 
virtual participants, with parameters set as in the simulation with Model A (see figure 12), 
except task-demand carryover was decreased to 10% Error-bars represent one standard 
error about the mean.   
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7 General Discussion 
We have presented a model of the UNRAVEL task that combines the proposed set-
shifting model of Gilbert and Shallice (2002) with a proposed place-keeping mechanism 
that embodies five assumptions: 
1. Temporal context is maintained through a noisy or somewhat fuzzy 
representation of one’s place in a task. During uninterrupted completion of a 
task this representation is updated as the task progresses in response to subtask 
completion. 
2. A separate representation of subtask history (i.e., recently completed subtasks) 
works to suppress perseverative errors. This representation is also event-based, 
in the sense that subtask completion results in updating of the record of subtask 
history. It is also subject to decay. 
3. Selection of the appropriate subtask at any point is a function of both of the 
above representations, and it is this selection that results in the all-or-none 
setting of top-down activation to lower-level mechanisms that control task set. 
4. Updating of temporal context and subtask history units on completion of a 
subtask is fallible. 
5. Interruptions result in blurring of the temporal context signal and decreased 
effectiveness of the subtask history record, with longer interruptions having 
larger effects on each representation. 
These assumptions work together to produce the observed behavior. The assumptions 
provide an alternative to the Altmann and Trafton (2015) model of place-keeping in that 
rather than attributing perseverative and anticipatory errors to failures in separate 
mechanisms (the remember and advance mechanisms, respectively), such errors are 
attributed instead to a noisy representation of position, with subtask history working to 
suppress perseverative errors.  
Short Interruption 
 
Long Interruption 
 
Figure 15: Predictions of Model B (i.e., Model A plus the place-keeping mechanism). Left 
panel: Simulation of short interruptions for three different response-stimulus intervals (α = 
0.70, ρ = 0.25). Right panel: Simulation of long interruptions for three different response-
stimulus intervals (α = 0.65, ρ = 0.00). Note that in neither case is there any appreciable effect 
of response-stimulus interval. Error-bars represent one standard error about the mean.  
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The above points specifically concern the mechanism (or mechanisms) that support 
place-keeping, yet a key empirical finding is that place-keeping in the UNRAVEL task 
is not affected by the response-stimulus interval. In fact, as shown in figure 12 (right 
panel), response-stimulus interval does affect error type in Model A. This is due entirely 
to the carryover of activation in the model’s Task Demand units, as decreasing the 
carryover of activation from 20% to 0% (or to even just 10%) eliminates the effect. In 
fact, the inclusion of task carryover in models of set-shifting is contentious. Gilbert and 
Shallice (2002) argue for its inclusion in order to explain effects of differential task 
difficulty on task switch costs (with switch costs being, paradoxically, higher for the 
transition from hard to easy tasks, than from easy to hard tasks). While carryover of task 
set activation can account for the effect, Yeung and Monsell (2003) did not find 
paradoxical switch costs in a study where the subtasks used different response sets (as is 
the case in the UNRAVEL task). Moreover the level of carryover employed in the 
simulations of Gilbert and Shallice is somewhat arbitrary, with their appendix 
suggesting that the results hold for any level between 0% (i.e., no task demand 
carryover!) and 37%. 
Our specific mathematical formulation of place-keeping, in terms of an activation-based 
mechanism conforming to the same dynamics as the Gilbert and Shallice (2002) set-
shifting model, also warrants some discussion. The mathematical formulation merely 
provides a way of combining the two key sources of information – temporal context and 
subtask history – in the selection of the current subtask. We hold no strong commitment 
to the specifics of the underlying formulae. Indeed, some aspects of the mathematical 
formulation are problematic (such as the use of negative activations and their interaction 
with lateral inhibition), and the combination of information sources might equally be 
expressed purely in probabilistic terms, yielding a profile of the probability of selection 
of each subtask during the interrupted UNRAVEL task. In our other words, our 
mathematical formulation is intended to be illustrative or demonstrative, rather than 
definitive. 
Moreover, while we have adopted the Gilbert and Shallice (2002) model as the set-
shifting substrate, this is also for expository purposes. Other models of set-shifting have 
been proposed (e.g., Brown et al., 2007; Grange et al., 2013; Sexton & Cooper, 2017, as 
well, of course, as Altmann & Gray, 2008). Our choice to use the Gilbert and Shallice 
model was motivated primary by the simplicity of its proposed mechanisms. This 
simplicity ensures that the operation of our proposed place-keeping mechanisms is not 
obscured. 
Finally, we have also described the place-keeping mechanism as a single system. That is, 
we have described Temporal Context units and Task History units as if they form an 
integrated mechanism. While our proposal is that temporal context and task history 
interact in the selection of position in a multi-step task, the latter may well be retained in 
a general purpose working memory, on the assumption that such a memory is subject to 
generally accepted memory biases of recency and decay.  
8 Conclusion 
The UNRAVEL task of Altmann and colleagues has previously proven to be well-
suited to the empirical investigation of interruptions. We have used the task in a 
somewhat different way, focusing on the potential interaction between two cognitive 
control processes – set-shifting and place-keeping – in the performance of a relatively 
To appear in Cognitive Psychology 
41 
 
complex task. To summarize, we found a decrease in response time on the UNRAVEL 
task with increasing response-stimulus interval. We interpret this as a fingerprint of set-
shifting. Equally, we found increased rates of perseverative errors with longer 
interruptions on the UNRAVEL task. We similarly interpret this as a fingerprint of 
Altmann et al.’s (2014) place-keeping function. However throughout three experiments 
we found no evidence to suggest an interaction between these functions. Moreover, the 
behavioral patterns were similar across three experiments using different interrupting 
tasks, strongly implying that the effects are independent of the interrupting task and 
hence that they specifically relate to cognitive control. 
To account for our results we have presented a model in which the processes 
responsible for set-shifting and place-keeping operate at separate levels and on distinct 
task representations. Effects related to set-shifting arise at the sub-task level, where an 
extended response-stimulus interval allows preparation, presumably in the form of task-
set reconfiguration. Effects related to place-keeping arise at the superordinate level, 
where a noisy sense of position in the task, combined with a potentially unreliable 
mechanism for updating that sense and an imperfect memory of completed subtasks, 
may give rise to perseverative or anticipatory errors. 
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Appendix: Additional Details of the Models 
Full code for both models, written in the C programming language, is available from 
http://www.ccnl.bbk.ac.uk/models. This appendix provides a verbal description of that 
code. 
Model A and Model B both function according to standard interactive activation 
principles. Thus, in both models all units have an associated activation value that varies 
over time between a minimum value (min = –1) and a maximum value (max = +1). The 
models operate on each trial by initializing the activation of all units for time t = 0, as 
described below, and then repeatedly updating activations of all units at successive time 
increments (t = 1; t = 2; t = 3; …), again as described below, until an output unit’s 
activation meets a response criterion. The specific response is that which corresponds to 
the output unit that meets the response criterion, while the number of time cycles 
between stimulus presentation (which need not occur at t = 0) and reaching the response 
criterion is an index of the model’s response time. 
Activation Initialization 
At the beginning of each trial, the activation of each unit (in both models) is set as 
follows: 
For each of the 14 input units: 𝑎𝑐𝑡!",! 0 = 0 
For each of the 14 output units: 𝑎𝑐𝑡!"#,! 0 = 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝×𝛽!"#×𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝×𝛽!"#×𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝛽! > 0𝑖𝑓 𝛽! < 0 
 
where step determines the granularity of time steps and is set to 0.0015 as in Gilbert and 
Shallice (2002) and βout is the bias on output units (set to –9 for all such units). For these 
parameter values this results in all output units being initialized to –0.0135. This is the 
value that output units would approach, given the step size and bias, in the absence of 
any input. 
For each of the 7 task demand units: 𝑎𝑐𝑡!",! 0 = 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟×𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣! 
where carryover is a parameter that determines the strength of task demand carry over 
from one trial to the next (set at 0.2, as in Gilbert & Shallice, 2002) and previ is the 
activation of task demand unit i at the end of the previous trial (or zero, for the first trial 
in a block). 
For each of the 7 top-down control units of Model A and each of the 7 task context units 
of model B: 𝑎𝑐𝑡!",! 0 = 0 
In addition, for Model B: 
Each temporal context unit is initialized at the beginning of a block as described in the 
main text, i.e.: 
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𝑎𝑐𝑡!"#,!(0) = 𝛼,𝛼 ∙ (1 − 𝛼) ! , if  𝑖 = 1  (i.e., the left-most unit) where 𝑑 is the number of steps between 𝑖 and unit 1 
 
and each of the 7 task history units is initialized to zero at the beginning of each block: 𝑎𝑐𝑡!!,! 0 = 0 
The activation of temporal context and task history units is fixed throughout each trial 
but immediately after generation of a response to task i and effectively at the beginning 
of the subsequent trial, the activation of temporal context units is shifted by one unit to 
the right (cycling back to the left-most unit as if the units were arranged in a circle 
rather than linearly), the activation of task history unit i is set to ρ, and the activation of 
each other task history unit is multiplied by ρ, thus implementing task history decay. 
Activation Calculation 
Following Gilbert and Shallice (2002), each non-input unit’s activation value is updated 
on each processing cycle according to the following equations: 
𝑎𝑐𝑡!,! 𝑡 + 1 = 𝑎𝑐𝑡!,! 𝑡 + 𝜀 + 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝 ×𝑛𝑒𝑡!,!(𝑡)× 𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡!,!(𝑡)         𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑡!,!(𝑡) > 0𝑎𝑐𝑡!,! 𝑡 −𝑚𝑖𝑛         𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑡!,!(𝑡) < 0 
where actx,i(t) is the activation of unit i of type x at time t, ε is a random noise term 
drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean of 0 and standard deviation of 0.006, 
step controls the step size as described above, netx,i(t) is the net input to unit i of type x 
at time t as described below, and min and max are parameters that determine the 
activation range (fixed at –1 and +1 respectively, as noted above). Following this 
calculation, all activations are clipped so that they do not fall outside of the range 
defined by min and max. 
The activation of input units remains at zero throughout the preparation interval (which 
in the simulations presented here, is either 0, 20 or 40 cycles), after which the input 
units corresponding to the trial’s stimulus dimensions (e.g., italic, near, red, above, 
vowel, even, more, for the left-most stimulus in figure 1 of the main text) are set to max, 
while all others remain at zero. 
Activation Propagation on Each Processing Cycle 
For each input unit activation is set to zero or max, as described in the previous 
subsection. For all other units whose activation varies throughout a trial, that variation is 
determined by netx,i(t), the net input to unit i of type x at time t. This is calculated 
separately for each type of unit and in addition may depend on whether a top-down 
control unit (for Model A) or task context unit (for Model B) is selected. netx,i(t) is 
calculated for each type of unit as follows: 
For each of the 7 top-down control units (in Model A) or task context units (in Model 
B): 𝑛𝑒𝑡!",! 𝑡 = 𝛽!" + 𝑎𝑐𝑡!"#,! 𝑡 − 1 ∙ 𝑤!",!"! − 𝑎𝑐𝑡!!,! 𝑡 − 1 ∙ 𝑤!!,! 
where  
• βtc is the bias on top-down control / task context units, set to –4 in both cases, 
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• acttmp,j(t – 1) is the activation of the jth temporal context unit at time t – 1 (or zero 
for Model A), wtc,ji is the weight from temporal context unit j to top-down 
control / task context unit i, and the sum represents the excitation from temporal 
context to the relevant control unit, and 
• actth,i(t – 1) is the activation of the ith task history unit at time t – 1 (or zero for 
Model A), whc,i is the weight from task history unit i to top-down control / task 
context unit i, and the term represents the inhibition from task history on the 
relevant control unit. 
For each of the 7 task-demand units (in both models): 
𝑛𝑒𝑡!",! 𝑡 = 𝛽!" + 𝑠! − 𝜆 𝑎𝑐𝑡!",! 𝑡 − 1!!!! + 𝑠!",!" ∙ 𝑎𝑐𝑡!"#,!(𝑡 − 1)!  
where  
• βtd is the bias on task demand units, set to –10, 
• si is the top-down control input strength for task demand unit i, if the top down 
control unit (for Model A) or task context unit (for Model B) for task i is 
selected, and zero otherwise, 
• λ is the lateral inhibition parameter, set to 4.0, and the sum represents the lateral 
inhibition from other task demand units, and 
• std,k is the strength of connections from output unit k to task demand unit i 
(which is +1 for connections from the two output units for task i and –1 for all 
other output units),  and the sum (over all 14 output units) represents the 
recurrent excitation / inhibition of output units on task demand units. 
For each of the 14 output units (in both models), activations are held fixed during the 
preparation interval. Only upon stimulus presentation are output units updated, with the 
net input to such units calculated as: 𝑛𝑒𝑡!"#,! 𝑡 = 𝛽!"# − 𝜆 ∙ 𝑎𝑐𝑡!"#,!! 𝑡 − 1 + 𝑠!",! ∙ 𝑎𝑐𝑡!",!(𝑡 − 1) + 𝑠!",!" ∙ 𝑎𝑐𝑡!",!(𝑡 − 1)!  
where  
• βout is the bias on output units, set to –9, 
• λ is the lateral inhibition parameter (set to 4.0, as above), i' is the other output 
node for this task (e.g., if i corresponds to the “above” output node, then i' will 
be the “below” output node, and vice versa), and the second term in the equation 
represents lateral inhibition between competing output nodes, 
• sio,i is the strength of task-specific input-output channels, and the third term in 
the equation represents excitation of output units from corresponding input units, 
and 
• sto,ji is the strength of association between task-demand and output units 
(assumed to be 2.5 for output units associated with the specific task and –2.5 for 
output units associated with each other task), and the final term represents 
excitation /inhibition of output units from task demand units. 
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Task Selection 
For Model A, the appropriate top down control unit for each UNRAVEL task was 
selected after 50 cycles, corresponding to a system with perfect place keeping but where 
recall of position in the UNRAVEL sequence takes 50 processing cycles. For Model B, 
a task control unit was selected if and when the activation of that unit exceeded a 
threshold, set to 0.9. If more than one unit’s activity exceeded the threshold only the 
most active of those units was selected. With the parameters given here, selection in 
Model B typically took between 20 and 40 processing cycles. 
The Response Criterion 
On each cycle, and after the activations of all units have been updated, the difference 
between the activation of the most active and next most active output units is calculated. 
If that difference exceeds a threshold – set to 0.15 as in the model of Gilbert and 
Shallice (2002) – then processing for the trial is terminated and the response 
corresponding to the output unit with the highest activation is produced. 
Interruptions 
Interruptions of each duration and at each level RSI were modeled as follows. First, the 
model was allowed to cycle for a number of cycles corresponding to the RSI (reflecting 
the fact that interruptions in the experimental tasks occurred after the RSI interval). The 
activation of all task history units was then decreased by a decay factor that varied with 
interruption length (0.5 for short interruptions, 0.0 for long interruptions). The 
activation of task context units was reset to zero. The activation of all temporal context 
units was reset with decreased temporal acuity (of 0.70 for short interruptions and 0.65 
for long interruptions). Finally, if a task context unit has been selected during the 
preparation interval, this was deselected. The UNRAVEL trial then resumed, with 
immediate presentation of an UNRAVEL stimulus, as in the experimental task.  
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